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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Stewardship on Firm Performance: 
A Family Ownership and Internal Governance Perspective. (December 2010) 
Curtis Leonus Wesley, B.S., United States Naval Academy; 
MBA, University of Maryland-College Park 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Joseph E. Coombs  
           Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
 
 
 
 
Current research in corporate governance focuses primarily upon minimization of 
agency costs in the shareholder-management relationship.   In this dissertation, I 
examine a complimentary perspective based upon stewardship theory.  The model 
developed herein leverages past research on socioemotional wealth to identify CEO 
attributes associated with stewardship behavior.  I examine whether these attributes lead 
to positive firm performance.  Moreover, I examine how family ownership and board of 
director characteristics influences the CEO stewardship – firm performance relationship.  
A 3-year unbalanced panel dataset using 268 S&P 1500 firms is analyzed using 
generalized least squares regression.  All covariates lag the dependent variable by 1-
year; constructs are included to control for popular agency prescriptions used to monitor, 
control, and incentivize executives. 
I find no relationship between the hypothesized constructs related to CEO 
stewardship (board memberships, organizational identity, and board tenure) and firm 
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performance (Tobin’s Q).  However, results reveal family ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between the quantity of CEO board memberships and firm 
performance.  Additionally, the presence of affiliated directors and community 
influential directors positively moderates the CEO board memberships-firm performance 
relationship.  The presence of community influential directors also positively moderates 
the relationship between CEO organizational identity and firm performance.    
Results from this dissertation provide moderate support for stewardship theory as a 
compliment to agency theory in corporate governance literature.  There is evidence that 
family ownership and board of director attributes strengthen the relationship between 
those CEO stewardship constructs and firm performance.  However, lack of a direct 
relationship between the CEO stewardship constructs and firm performance suggest a 
need more fine-grained constructs that measure stewardship.   
A substantial amount of research exists in corporate governance using the 
principal-agent model.  The research herein extends this research by using stewardship 
theory to compliment the dominant agency model.  I hope this research encourages 
scholars to take an integrative approach by (1) taking a renewed look at alternate 
theories of corporate governance such as stewardship theory, and (2) continue work that 
focuses upon firm performance maximization through CEO stewardship as well as 
agency loss mitigation through monitoring and control of the CEO. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of agency theory as a description of and prescription for monitoring and 
control of management activity has been the primary theoretical lens for corporate 
governance for the past 30 years.  The central tenet of agency theory is that the divergent 
interests of owners and managers create situations where managers administer the 
owners’ assets according to their own self-interest to the detriment of the interests of the 
owner (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983a and 1983b).  Thus, diffusion of ownership 
and the delegation of management activity are the central concern of agency theory.  The 
diffusion of ownership allows principals to mitigate their ownership risk more easily 
than the agents they employ leading their agents to take actions while managing the 
principal’s firm that reduces their own risk (Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen and Meckling 
1976).  A review of corporate governance literature reveals a litany of inconclusive 
results and contradictory findings on agency prescriptions designed to control the agency 
loss of principals (see Dalton et al. 2008 for an excellent review). A reexamination of 
corporate governance using different theoretical lenses may lead to alternate descriptions 
of the ownership – management relationship and different prescriptions that maximize 
firm value.  
 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Organization Science. 
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STEWARDSHIP AS A VIABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY
 Relative to agency theory, stewardship theory has received limited attention as a 
theoretical model for explaining the relationship between firm managers and firm 
owners (Davis et al. 1997).  Donaldson laments that corporate governance research relies 
too heavily on organization economics’ (which agency theory and transaction costs 
theory are based upon) model of man that portrays human motivation and behavior too 
narrowly; organization economics discounts behavior of human beings that cannot be 
adequately explained by economic theory such as cooperative activity among people 
(Donaldson 1990).  Human beings are seen as self-interested, opportunistic, utility 
maximizers whose primary focus is economic benefit (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   A 
tension between principal and agent occurs as both parties cannot maximize their 
economic utility in the principal-agent relationship.  Principals are more risk-seeking 
than their agents while agents possess more information about the firm they manage than 
their principals.  This is problematic as principals have provided the capital that is at risk 
and are the primary residual claimant; meanwhile, the agent, who utilizes the capital to 
generate rents (and therefore the residuals), bears an employment risk that is perceived 
to be greater than the risk of capital as perceived by the principal.  After all, principals 
can diversify their risk through their investment portfolio where as the agent must carry 
employment risk.    
Stewardship theory addresses the underlying agency theory assumption that there 
is a tension between the risk propensity of principals and their agents whereby agents 
focus their actions upon mitigating their personal risk at the expense of principals. The 
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agency model posits that owners (principals) must recognize this tension and prevent 
agent activity related to moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979) by monitoring managers and 
developing mechanisms that align the interests of agents with principals and prevent 
opportunistic actions by agents (Eisenhardt 1989, Fama and Jensen 1983a and 1983b, 
Shavell 1979).    
Stewardship theory assumes that managers behave as trustworthy stewards of the 
organization and focus on the collective good of the constituents in the firm regardless of 
the manager’s self-interests (Davis et al. 1997, Donaldson and Davis 1991).  The 
possibility of moral hazard is assumed away because the manager (steward) decides to 
work on behalf of the owners; thus, the risk differential between owner and manager that 
drives the hidden actions of managers in the principal-agent model are not acted upon by 
the steward manager. The steward manager believes ownership will equitably share the 
residual claims from the firm; thus, maximization of those claims for the owner 
maximizes the share of the steward manager. In other words, there is no misalignment 
between the interests of managers and owners because steward managers believe the 
pursuit of what is best for the organization is what is best for their constituents and 
themselves (Davis et al. 1997).  Actions that benefit the organization and their owners 
are taken even if such actions are not in the steward’s immediate self-interest. This 
underlying assumption of commonality between managers and owners runs counter to 
the assumption of the individualistic, self serving, opportunists that organizational 
economists have offered as the model of firm management in a market system 
(Donaldson 1990).   
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Stewardship research focuses on psychological factors and situational 
mechanisms that determine desirable manager behavior (Davis et al. 1997).   The 
foundation of this research stream is not the economic theory of man promoted by 
organizational economics (Barney and Ouchi 1986, Williamson 1981) but is derived 
from human resource management and organizational behavior research that offer higher 
order explanations for the proposed steward behavior of managers.  McGregor’s (1960) 
development of Theory Y offers an early attempt to provide an alternate view of human 
nature in organizational settings. A major assumption of Theory Y states: 
“external control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for 
bringing about effort toward organizational objectives.  Man will exercise 
self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is 
committed (McGregor 1960, p 65).”     
Davis et al. (1997) build upon this human model by proposing stewards are 
concerned with the collective good, are intrinsically motivated, and possess a long-term 
orientation.  Stewards can be identified based on personality traits attributed to them that 
often lead to the positive organizational behaviors they exhibit (Avey et al. 2009, Wright 
and Quick 2009).   Table 1 provides a summary of current literature linking these 
personality traits and personal attributes to behavioral outcomes. 
 Stewardship theory development has followed two distinct but abbreviated 
tracks.  The first stream of stewardship research focuses on the manager as the unit of 
analysis and the intrinsic motivation and situational contexts that determine stewardship 
behavior (Davis et al. 1997).   The primary focus of this type of research is identifying 
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the antecedents of stewardship behavior.  Donaldson (1990) develops the second 
theoretical stream by focusing on the contractual arrangement between principal and 
agent (steward) as the unit of analysis.  He deems agency theory as primarily focused on 
the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.  When focused upon the 
principal-agent contract, the mitigation of agency loss through proper identification of 
where principal-agent interests misalign is paramount; Donaldson (1990) counters by 
proposing that there isn’t any misalignment between the interests of steward managers 
and owners because steward managers believe the pursuit of organization goals is what 
is best for the principals and themselves.   
Moreover, Donaldson (1990) takes a positivist view of stewardship theory by 
stating that owners who design governance structures that maximize the efficiency of 
steward CEO’s pursuit of superior organizational performance will be rewarded.  His 
opinion takes a normative aspect; Donaldson (1990) also declares the focus of owners 
should change to reflect this principal-steward assumption when they believe they 
employ a steward.  Owners that believe their firm requires strong oversight of 
management should provide strong agency-prescribed governance structures; 
meanwhile, owners that believe (or consider) their firm’s management require the 
latitude to make decisions independently and autonomously should ensure governance 
structures allow for maximum flexibility in management decision making.  
For instance, Donaldson and Davis (1991) argue that steward CEOs who are 
stewards need corporate governance structures that give them high levels of authority 
and discretion (ex. CEO duality) in order to maximize firm performance.  They found 
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moderate support for their assertion as their empirical model showed that shareholder 
return on equity was greater in firms led by CEOs who were board chairpersons versus 
firms led by independent board chairs.  A stewardship theorist would argue the results 
are evidence that such leadership structures facilitate the proper CEO activities 
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994) and counters the agency argument that such structures 
lead to moral hazards that adversely impact firm performance as in other studies (Daily 
and Dalton 1994, Rechner and Dalton 1991).   
Likewise, previous research on executive power and managerial discretion often 
posit that more powerful CEOs have the ability to extract rents for themselves at the 
expense of shareholders (Finkelstein and Boyd 1998, Hayward and Hambrick 1997), 
take actions that minimize personal risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981, Lane et al. 1998, 
Shavell 1979), or entrench themselves as leaders of the firm (Finkelstein and D’Aveni 
1994).  For instance, the pursuit of firm expansion via acquisition has been linked to the 
pursuit of higher compensation and executive entrenchment by agency theorists 
(Hayward and Hambrick 1997, Lane et al. 1998).  An alternate explanation yet to be 
investigated empirically is that the managerial power that preceded the executive 
entrenchment is necessary for managers to guide the firm into such strategic actions as 
mergers and acquisitions; higher compensation and manager tenure are consequences of 
these actions.  Managerial power and discretion are necessary to empower firm leaders 
to take actions that lead to increased firm performance.  Often, such activities require 
strong leadership and a high level of managerial discretion to execute properly.  
Normatively, if a steward CEO feels that such actions will enhance firm value, the firm’s 
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shareholders (through the firm’s board of directors) should facilitate such activity. As a 
consequence, Davis et al. (1997) acknowledge that both agency theory and stewardship 
theory have explanatory power, are not mutually exclusive, and are oft times situational.  
This observation may provide an explanation for the confounding and/or spurious results 
in past corporate governance research (see Shen 2003, for a theoretical argument).   
Therefore, owners must assess the type of manager they employ throughout the 
manager’s tenure and establish appropriate governance structures designed to maximize 
the efficacy of firm management to drive organizational performance. In this manner, 
owners who employ a steward manager can leverage this manager by establishing firm 
mechanisms and organizational structures that support the manager’s activities to meet 
the needs of the organization (Galbraith 1973, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967); this leads to 
increased firm performance that enriches all parties with valid residual claims (Davis et 
al. 1997, Donaldson, 1990). 
Stewardship theory can be further developed to identify situations where there is a 
higher likelihood that management stewardship behavior creates desirable organizational 
outcomes and a lessened likelihood that unprincipled agent behavior creates undesirable 
organizational outcomes.  Moreover, the identification of stewardship situations will 
facilitate empirical testing and construct development to define the structural 
arrangements between management and owners, and organizational designs that are the 
antecedents and consequences of stewardship behavior.   
Accounting for the warnings from Albanese et al. (1997) and Barney (1990) 
suggesting that the development of stewardship theory overly simplifies and confuses 
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the principal-agent problem and develops naïve viewpoints regarding the motivation of 
managers, I suggest that agency theory’s application in corporate governance is too 
narrowly focused on self-interests and may not account for situations whereby managers 
act in ownership’s best interest independent of agency theory prescriptions.   I 
concurrently submit that solely utilizing stewardship prescriptions absent of some level 
of monitoring and oversight is naïve as well.  A Middle East proverb states my position 
plainly: “trust in Allah, but tie up your camel!” Neither agency theory nor stewardship 
theory fully describe and predict managerial behavior in the context of diffused 
ownership.  However, corporate governance research is lacking the complementary 
perspective on organizational life that can be provided by stewardship theory.  
Stewardship theory may provide additional explanation and support for long-term 
focused managerial activities that may benefit the shareholder and the firm.  These may 
include a firm’s interaction with its external environment by supporting corporate social 
responsibility projects, and firm strategic activity such as investment in research and 
development. Thus, corporate governance scholars can focus on contingency scenarios 
that describe and promote value creation independent of managerial opportunism while 
attempting to describe and remedy principal-agent goal misalignment to minimize 
agency costs.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Herein, I develop and test a theoretical perspective that attempts to explain the 
behavioral antecedents of stewardship and the relationship between CEO stewardship 
and firm performance.  Specifically, I draw on socioemotional wealth research and 
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propose that socioemotional wealth is an antecedent of stewardship behavior.  This 
allows for the development of constructs based upon the definition of socioemotional 
wealth that can be used to empirically test the relationship between CEO stewardship 
and firm performance.  In an attempt to further develop this stream of research, I also 
present a theoretical model of how family ownership influences the proposed 
relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.  Family business literature 
often links family ownership and control to actions associated with firm stewardship 
(See Table 2).  Likewise, I present a model that builds on the assertion concerning a 
positive association between stewards that are provided supportive organizational 
structures facilitating resource access and firm performance.  Specifically, this model 
shows how board composition that supports the CEO in the external operating 
environment positively influences firm performance.  Each theoretical model is tested 
empirically.  Figure 1 summarizes these relationships and the forthcoming hypotheses.   
The research questions addressed in this dissertation are summarized as follows: 
1. Is CEO stewardship through the use of socioemotional wealth constructs 
 positively related to firm performance? 
2. Does family ownership and control moderate the relationship between CEO 
 stewardship and firm performance? 
3. Does board composition designed to influence the external environment 
 moderate the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance? 
Using these research questions, I make several contributions to research in 
corporate governance.  First, this research highlights the importance of providing 
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alternative theories of maximizing firm performance in addition to minimizing agency 
costs.  Strategy scholars such as Mahoney (2005) assert that “modern agency theorists 
have become (overly) optimistic that various governance mechanisms (e.g. the market 
for corporate control, the market for managers) have solved agency problems (p 139).”  
Recent popular press and scholarly works provide an array of examples where tools 
based upon agency prescriptions not only did not have the desired effect but increased 
moral hazard among executives (O’Connor et al. 2006).   We continue to observe a 
measure of truth in Ghoshal and Moran’s (1996) prognostication that tools developed to 
provide more monitoring and control to owners only elicits more deviant behavior from 
unprincipled agents.  Therefore, one can conclude two things: An alternate view may be 
required that focuses on maximization of firm performance through the identification of 
executives that behave as stewards of the firm; the alternative view must be utilized 
concurrently with the agency model to create a holistic model of corporate governance.  
I am attempting an initial step in the further development of an alternate governance 
model, i.e. stewardship theory, by identifying and testing constructs that are theorized to 
be associated with CEO stewardship.   
Second, I test the implicit assumption in family business literature that families are 
stewards of their firms and the presence of family ownership should translate into better 
firm performance.  Contrary to this assumption, the results are equivocal.  Family firms 
have been shown to perform better than non-family firms because of lowered agency 
costs (Anderson & Reeb 2003); however, in other instances, family firms either 
performed more poorly than non-family firms (Perez-Gonzalez 2006) or the family 
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firm’s performance was on par with its peers (Miller et al. 2007).  Given these mixed 
results, I test whether family ownership and control positively moderates the CEO 
steward-firm performance relationship.  This situation presents a principal-agent 
relationship that increases the goal congruence between the principal and the agent, and 
should yield a further refined test of the influence of family firm ownership and control 
on firm performance.  Moreover, the model tests the underlying premise that goal 
congruence in the principal-agent relationship reduces agency costs, leading to better 
firm performance. 
Third, this dissertation integrates stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory in testing the influence of board roles on external stakeholder support for firm 
goals.  Directors play an important role in acquiring resources for the firms they oversee 
as board members (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  Given the roles that directors have to 
provide guidance and counsel to firm management, a model incorporating CEO 
stewardship is a natural extension of resource dependency theory and answers the call to 
provide another explanation for superior firm performance besides minimizing agency 
costs.   
SUMMARY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation proceeds in the following manner.  In Chapter II, I develop theory 
that links CEO socioemotional wealth to CEO stewardship and establishes the 
foundation for constructs to be used in empirical analysis.  CEO stewardship behaviors 
will be shown to be associated with steward-like organizational cultures within firms.  
Also, a review of family literature as it relates to CEO stewardship will occur, 
12 
 
culminating in the development of how family ownership and control positively 
influence the CEO stewardship – firm performance relationship.  A final section within 
this chapter focuses on the resource provision and external influence capabilities of the 
board of directors and how the board’s composition influences the CEO stewardship – 
firm performance relationship as well.  Hypotheses will be developed concerning each 
part of the chapter.  Chapter III provides the statistical methodology, variables, and data 
sources used in the study.  In Chapter IV, I present the results of the statistical 
methodology while in Chapter V I conclude with a discussion of how the results relate to 
the theory developed in the dissertation.  I also close with conclusions that can be drawn 
from this study and limitations to this dissertation. 
13 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The previous chapter provided an overview of stewardship theory, how it contrasts 
with agency theory, and how stewardship theory can be used with agency theory to 
complement existing corporate governance research.  This chapter is concerned with the 
following questions: 
1.  How is CEO stewardship related to firm performance? 
2.  Does family firm ownership influence the CEO stewardship – firm 
 performance relationship? 
3.  Does the role of directors influence the CEO stewardship – firm performance 
 relationship? 
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH AS AN ANTECEDENT TO STEWARDSHIP 
Davis et al. (1997) discuss antecedents of intrinsic characteristics such as 
collectivism, trustworthiness, and pro-organizational behavior, positing that stewards are 
motivated by higher order needs, have a strong identification with their organization, 
have high self-efficacy, and possess a high level of power based on their relationships 
with peers, superiors and subordinates. Recently, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) used a 
similar description when introducing the concept of socioemotional wealth to explain 
motivations of family businesses to undertake or eschew certain strategic activities.  
They describe socioemotional wealth as “the non-financial aspects that meet the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007, pp. 106).”   
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Family control is a high priority in running the firm because firm identity and 
family identity are highly interrelated in family firms.  Family owners are not only 
concerned about personal and family enrichment as principals in the firm (Chrisman et 
al. 2007) but  also protecting their socioemotional wealth associated with firm ownership 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).  Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) note that socioemotional wealth 
is strongly linked to the ability to exert authority and control (Schulze et al. 2003), the 
perpetuation of a dynasty (Casson 1999), and the development and sustenance of 
reputation and social capital (Westphal 1999).  In the context of the family firm, the 
preservation of socioemotional wealth may be more important than extracting agency 
rents and growing personal (or family) monetary wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).   
Executives operating outside the context of the family firm may also have similar non-
financial motivations with respect to the companies they manage.  Thus, a deeper 
investigation of the antecedents of socioemotional wealth and its link to stewardship is 
warranted; identifying executives with high levels of socioemotional wealth may be the 
key to identifying firms that are lead by managers who are likely behave as stewards of 
the firm.  
“Wealth” in the term socioemotional wealth infers that socioemotional factors can 
be accumulated and lost (i.e. added and subtracted).  Organizational identification (OI), 
social capital, and power are factors of importance in defining socioemotional wealth as 
they are the “wealth” constructs that can accumulate and be lost.  
As defined by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), socioemotional wealth is closely 
associated with organizational identification.¹ At the micro level, OI is conceptualized in 
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the social identity of the individual (Ashforth et al. 2008).  Tajfel’s (1978) foundational 
definition of social identity is “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives 
from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership (pp. 63).”  Furthermore, 
Tajfel (1982) asserts this identity is defined by an individual’s awareness of his/her 
identity, an evaluation of the identity against a set of values, and consequently, an 
emotional investment in the identity.   Therefore, a person’s social identify may be 
strongly associated with their occupation and place of employment; for senior executives 
such as the CEO of a firm, this association may be more pronounced and lead to 
behavior that reflects strong attachment to the organization. 
Ashforth et al. (2008) expand upon the concept of identification by defining the 
core of identity (I am, I value, I feel) and the content of identity (I care about, I want, I 
believe, I can do) as well as linking it to behaviors associated with identity (pp. 330, 
Figure 1).   The stronger a person’s social identity is linked to their identification with an 
organization, the more organizational identification involves the core and content of 
identity leading to identity-induced behaviors associated with the organization.   For 
example, Riketta’s (2005) meta-analysis of OI found relatively high correlations 
between OI and positive behaviors associated with stewardship such as job involvement, 
in-role performance, and extra-role performance.  It appears that when the link between 
a person’s social identification and organizational commitment is very strong, an 
individual’s stewardship behavior is likely to manifest itself.   
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Likewise, the deeper the link between a person’s social identification and 
organizational identification, the more stable the identification is between the person and 
the organization (Ashforth et al. 2008).  The consequences of such depth may not only 
encourage positive stewardship behaviors with respect to the organization but also 
institutionalize the link between OI and person’s social identification.  Therefore, an 
attempt to change the link between the social identification of a person and the 
characteristics of the organization that feed the person’s organization identity is met with 
resistance by individuals (Aquino and Douglas 2003), and often leads to the individuals 
resisting organizational change (Bouchikhi and Kimberly 2003).   As a consequence, 
individuals with high socioemotional wealth are more likely to preserve their 
socioemotional wealth tied to the organization’s identity.   Therefore, the preservation of 
socioemotional wealth will drive activity that develops organizational outcomes to 
which a person’s social identity and organizational identity are linked. 
The development of social capital by individuals within an organization is closely 
linked to the accumulation of socioemotional wealth associated with that organization.  
Arregle et al. (2007) define social capital “as the relationships between individuals and 
organizations that facilitate action and create value (p. 75).”  The goodwill and resources 
made available via reciprocal relationships of trust (Adler and Kwon 2002) provide the 
basis for competitive advantage in the organization (Barney 1991) and can be 
accumulated.    The individual’s social network often overlaps with relationships 
developed within the organization; the internal relationships involving the individual 
become more interwoven with the professional relationships developed internal to the 
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organization.  The depth and breadth of an individual’s structural dimension of social 
capital would vary depending upon her/his roles and responsibilities within the 
organization.  Likewise, the nurturing of the relationships of the interdependent actors 
would strengthen the relational dimension of social capital.  These internal linkages 
among individuals (and groups) within the organization foster cohesiveness and 
collective action (Adler and Kwon 2002) producing individuals, groups, and an 
organization focused on the collective good  (Pearson et al. 2008).  In this manner, the 
accumulation of social capital is directly linked to an individual’s stewardship behavior 
and an organization’s stewardship culture.     
The accumulation (and utility) of authority alluded to by Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007) is a description of power.  Pfeffer describes power as “the capacity of social 
actors to exert their will and to achieve their goals in a relationship (Shen 2003: pp. 
468).”  Blau (1964) split the concept of power into formal power awarded by assuming a 
leadership role or position in an organization and informal power developed through 
interpersonal activity and social exchanges.  Informal power can be considered in the 
context of interpersonal relationships and distinct from institutionalized power based 
upon organizational position (Davis et al. 1997).   
The aggregate of an individual’s power normally increases with time when the 
individual remains affiliated with a particular organization.  For instance, Shen (2003) 
observed that “regardless of its sources, CEO power increases over time (p. 468)” and is 
often conceptualized by including CEO tenure as an indicator of CEO power.   
Moreover, informal power often is derived from the personal prestige and social status 
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of the individual (Finkelstein 1992).  Social capital can accumulate based upon the 
length of tenure in an organization and become an important source of informal, 
personal power (Barkema and Pennings 1998, Greve and Mitsuhashi 2007, Shen and 
Cannella 2002).  Individuals with longer tenure in organizations have more time and 
opportunity to develop interpersonal relationships and reciprocal obligations that allow 
them to amass social capital to affect organizational activities (Greve and Mitsuhashi 
2007).  Moreover, the prudent, impactful use of their power often delivers positive 
reputational effects that further builds upon the executive’s social capital and personal 
power (Greve and Mitsuhashi 2007).  Thus, an executive’s power “depends upon the 
embeddedness in the firm and on the social relationships they have built up over the 
years” (Barkema and Pennings 2007: pp. 976).   
An executive’s socioemotional wealth is directly linked to the executive’s 
organizational identity, organizational social capital, and organizational power.  Steward 
executives may develop a strong link between social identification and OI and have most 
likely developed the social capital necessary to be powerful in their organization. An 
individual’s socioemotional wealth builds by the strengthening of their identity with the 
organization, the amassing of social capital within an organization, and the development 
of power through role promotion and interpersonal relationships.  Because a number of 
events (termination, reorganizations, hostile takeovers, bankruptcy, etc.) could diminish 
the amount of an individual’s socioemotional wealth tied to an organization, an 
executive is motivated to nurture, protect, and develop the organization with which 
her/his socioemotional wealth is linked (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).  Moreover, because 
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attributes associated with socioemotional wealth (organizational identification, social 
capital, and informal power) often amass with organizational tenure, executives who 
value this type of non-economic wealth will take a long-term view of the success of their 
organizations and focus on long-term profitability and firm value, akin to taking a 
steward’s view of the firm.    Based upon the aforementioned arguments that link 
stewardship to socioemotional wealth, I propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  CEO’s socioemotional wealth is positively related to 
a firm’s long-term performance.  
STEWARDSHIP, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
An organization’s culture is often driven by its leadership. Expressions of morality 
and trustworthy actions by firm employees are frequently discussed as consequences of 
stewardship behavior by a firm’s executives.  Often, the moral and trustworthy manner 
in which a CEO behaves leads to the CEO possessing a reputation of honesty and fair-
mindedness with organizational stakeholders (Jones, 1995).  Executives that behave as 
stewards are trusted by executives of other firms, by their owners, and by actors in the 
capital and product markets.   Thus, steward-like behavior from managers at the top of 
the organization often promotes positive organizational citizenship behaviors throughout 
the firm.   
Like descriptions of firm stewards and their behaviors, Zahra et al. (2008) 
describes stewardship cultures as pro-social, collectivist, cooperative, organizational 
environments which motivate employees who trust the organization.  Employees are 
mutually interdependent yet autonomous, strongly identify with the organization, and 
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often provide discretionary contributions to the organization for the benefit of all (Zahra 
et al. 2008).  A culture of stewardship within a firm facilitates employees to manage 
internal and external relationships with long-term orientations (Miller et al. 2008).  This 
allows firms to focus upon the development of their core competencies to further expand 
their firm-specific advantages in the marketplace (Miller and LeBreton-Miller 2006) 
instead of using firm resources to manage employee-management relationships within 
the firm.  This leads to the development of competitive advantage through intra- and 
interorganizational relationships based upon mutual trust (Jones 1995, Jones and Wicks 
1999).  
High stewardship cultures can develop competitive advantages based on strategic 
flexibility to develop core competencies and exploit firm-specific advantages (Zahra et 
al. 2008).  Strategic outcomes of firms with such cultures include having better human 
resource practices and fewer downsizing events, greater investment in R&D leading to 
more firm patents, fewer unrelated acquisitions, and less risky strategic investments than 
firms without a stewardship culture (Miller and LeBreton-Miller 2006).  The long-term 
orientation of firms with stewardship cultures results in more loyal customers, higher 
investment in nonfinancial projects (such as corporate social projects), and small, long-
term supplier network (Miller and LeBreton-Miller 2006). Such activities are thought to 
lead to higher levels of long-term value for the firm.  Moreover, theory development by 
Jones and colleagues suggests that steward-like behavior is necessary for efficiency and 
long-term profitability in a capitalist economic system (Jones 1995, Jones et al.  2007, 
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Jones and Wicks 1999).  These behaviors can contribute to a firm’s competitive 
advantage over less trustworthy firms (Jones and Wicks 1999).   
While previous theory developed herein discusses the link between a CEO’s 
socioemotional wealth and stewardship, a positivists’ view of stewardship would focus 
upon firms led by CEOs who would likely possess stewardship attributes.   The family-
owned business (FOB) led by the family CEO may present researchers with the most 
parsimonious example of a steward-led firm.  Therefore, CEO stewardship, its influence 
upon organizational culture and its relationship to firm performance is explained further 
in the context of the family firm.  
The Family Firm: Evidence of the Steward CEO and a Firm’s Stewardship Culture 
CEOs of FOBs are often considered stewards of the firm they lead as they are 
commonly the founder or a relative of the founder (Chrisman et al. 2003).  
Consequently, they have a high personal stake in the firm’s success (Beehr et al.  1997).  
Their position as owner and manager of the firm may also lessen the concern of goal 
incongruence between principal and agent as they can often be considered one and the 
same (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   
FOB CEOs pro-organizational, collectivist behavior (see Table 2) can be attributed 
to the value of cooperating for the success of the family firm over defection to satisfy 
their economic self-interest (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003).  Moreover, FOB CEOs may 
value and protect their socioemotional wealth associated with firm ownership (Gomez-
Mejia et al. 2007).  The FOB CEO may be keenly interested in protecting and 
developing the family’s influence and  power (Schulze et al. 2003), organizational 
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and/or social identification of the family with the firm (Casson 1999), and the 
maintenance and strengthening of the family’s social capital (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007).  
The preservation of the family firm is of the utmost concern to the FOB family CEO and 
the preservation of socioemotional wealth may be more important than extracting agency 
rents and growing personal (or family) monetary wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007).   
Existing family business research reveals a high likelihood that FOBs exhibit 
organizational attributes (such as possessing a clan-like, family feel) that are associated 
with a culture of stewardship (Sharma 2005).  Corbetta and Salvatto (2004) comment 
that family firms with stewardship cultures have high levels of interorganizational and 
intraorganizational trust among their employees.   Burden sharing, collaboration, and 
cooperation are the norm leading to a loyal, well-trained, empowered staff (Eddleston 
and Kellermanns 2007, Miller et al. 2008, Zahra et al. 2008) that produce valuable 
discretionary contributions from autonomous, independent workers (Zahra et al. 2008).   
Family firms that possess organizational stewardship attributes have similar 
positive strategic outcomes.  For instance, the Miller et al. (2008) study reveals that to 
broaden market share and enter into related markets, FOBs do more reputation 
development via a variety of marketing channels, develop a good working environment 
through their training and work policies, and place a strong emphasis on the 
development and management of customer and supplier connections.   Such a long-term 
market focus leads to high client satisfaction and loyalty and strong ties with outside 
stakeholders, allowing management to invest in strategies that create a competitive 
advantage through the development of internal core competencies (Miller and LeBreton-
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Miller 2006, Miller et al. 2008).   In fact, Sirmon et al. (2008) conclude a family firm’s 
strategic actions may be profitable because the firm benefits from family influence that 
produces steward-like decisions. Specifically, Sirmon et al. (2008) surmised that family 
firms with strong ownership positions but without majority ownership were not 
hampered by the agency costs associated with majority control.  Often, large family 
firms have majority stakeholders who are not the families themselves even though the 
family often maintains management control of the firm.  This scenario suggests that 
firms benefit from the organizational culture and management control of family 
ownership.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 2a (H2a):  Family firm ownership positively moderates the 
relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.   
Furthermore, it is shown that FOBs being led by CEOs that exhibit behavior 
associated with firm stewardship often produce positive financial performance 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003, Kang 2000, Villalonga and Amit 2006).  A study by 
Anderson et al. (2003) reveals that family firms have a lower cost of debt because the 
incentive and management structures in family firms are sufficient to protect the 
interests of debt holders (and  is also a reflection of the stewardship behaviors of firm 
leadership).  Likewise, when the FOB is managed by the CEO who is a family member 
versus an outside agent, the valuation of the family firm’s equity is higher (Anderson 
and Reeb 2003). Results from these past studies imply that capital markets value the 
stewardship role of the family member CEO of a publicly traded FOB.  As a 
consequence, 
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b):  Being led by a family member CEO positively 
moderates the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance. 
A STEWARDSHIP PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL GOVERNANCE 
Boards of directors are charged with the oversight of management activity on 
behalf of firm shareholders (see Dalton et al. 2008 for a thorough review).  Many 
research questions using agency theory seek an answer to how the boards of directors 
can effectively monitor managers to ensure managers make decisions in the best interest 
of shareholders (Duetsch 2005, Holmstrom 1979), do not shirk their duties (Eisenhardt 
1989, Fama 1980, Holmstrom 1979) or consume unearned perquisites (Fama and Jensen 
1983a and 1983b, Shavell 1979).    Effective board monitoring is thought to lead to 
higher firm performance (Dalton et al. 1998, Rhoades et al. 2001, Zahra and Pearce 
1989).  Such inquiries often center on investigating the effects of board composition and 
the board leadership structure. 
Agency theorists argue that the boards’ willingness to monitor the actions of 
management is directly related to their independence from the firm’s executives 
(Johnson et al. 1996).  The current domestic governance structures required by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and listing guidelines from the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ promote the notion that board independence is linked 
to some level of monitoring and internal control within the firm (Dalton et al. 2008).  For 
instance, the SOX outlines independence for the purposes of service on the audit 
committee as not accepting any fees from the firm and not being affiliated with the firm 
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or its subsidiaries.  Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange defines an independent 
director as a director not having a material relationship with the firm, partner, 
shareholder, or firm officer.   
However, many theorists also effectively argue and reveal empirically that board 
independence is a fallacy (Hemalin and Weisbach 1988, 1991, Shivdasani and Yermack 
1999).  CEO’s can influence the tenure of board members (Westphal and Zajac 1997) 
and effectively usurp or moderate the internal control of any remaining board members 
(Hemalin and Weisbach 1988, 1991).  Likewise, inside directors report directly to the 
CEO making it unlikely that they would criticize the CEO (Baysinger and Hoskisson 
1990, Weisbach 1988).   Moreover, directors with direct business ties to the firm risk 
those business relationships if they offer criticism of the firm’s leadership (Westphal and 
Zajac 1997).  Even those directors deemed to be independent are viewed as sympathetic 
to the CEO as their tenure on the board is based on their ability to “get along” with the 
CEO and other board members (Sutton 2004).  Likewise, director judgments can become 
more biased as their wealth associated through board service increases (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2006, Dalton and Dalton 2005) and their ability to have their directorship 
rescinded is reduced via the covenants that govern board elections (Bebchuk and Cohen 
2005). 
Conflicting results from past  research on internal control of management may lead 
one to believe the link between board oversight and firm performance is spurious at best 
(Dalton et al. 1998, Rhoades et al. 2001).  However, an alternate viewpoint has emerged 
whereby board members are viewed as strategic resources of the firms where they hold 
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directorships (Barney 1991, Wernerfelt 1984).  The utility of the board member is based 
on the quality of the advice and counsel given to management and the quantity of 
resources made available to the firm and the CEO via the board member (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978, Hillman et al. 2000, Hillman and Dalziel 2003).   The ability to support 
the firm’s objectives is of value and the independence of the board member is of less 
importance.  For instance, agency theorists argue that board member interlocks 
(Mizruchi 1996, 2004) and social ties (Westphal 1999) involving the CEOs of firms 
undermine the oversight capability of directors.  Conversely, those who espouse a 
resource dependence view (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggest that networking and 
knowledge diffusion associated with board interlocks and social ties are highly valued 
and drive subsequent firm performance (Davis 1991, Davis and Greve 1997, 
Geletkanycz and Hambrick 1997, Hillman and Dalziel 2003, Stearns and Mizruchi 
1993).  A study by Carpenter and Westphal (2001) revealed that when directors’ social 
ties were strategically linked to the firm on which board they sat, they enhanced the 
firm’s strategic decision making.    More recently, McDonald et al. (2008) showed that 
outside director acquisition experience is positively related to the firm’s acquisition 
performance.   
Perhaps the influence of the board of directors is situational (Shen 2003) and a 
variety of structures are needed to produce positive results.  Sirmon et al. (2008) noted 
that family influence in the management of the firm sans a controlling interest may allow 
the board of directors to monitor and guide executives, which positively influences 
strategic decisions and allows for profitable outcomes.   As Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
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and Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) point out, the role of the board encompasses 
monitoring and oversight (agency theory), and providing counsel and resources 
(resource dependency); thus, future research must close the gap of knowledge in the 
latter so that we have a complete account of the impact of board effects on firms.   
Theory on stewardship is consistent with alternate views on corporate governance 
that focus on how a board supports management’s attempt to drive firm performance.  
Owners are charged with the responsibility of providing an environment in which their 
steward managers can maximize their performance on the owners’ behalf.  Such 
activities begin with the selection of board members as the director’s role focuses on 
providing the necessary resources and guidance to maximize the value of the firm 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).    As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have succinctly outlined, 
the primary benefits boards provide include (1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) 
channels of communication between the firm and external organizations, and (4) 
preferred access to external resources the firm may require.  Therefore, consistent with 
the resource dependence view of corporate governance, board members will be selected 
by shareholders to maximize the effectiveness of having a steward CEO so that 
resources the directors provide can be maximized. 
The Role of Directors as Counselors and Resource Providers for Steward CEOs 
Acting as stewards, [owners] may place outside directors (affiliates and 
independents) on the board to provide industry-specific expertise, 
objective advice, or generally act as advocates for corporate health and 
viability. Consequently, a relation potentially exists between the board's 
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independence and firm performance because of the counsel and advice 
that outside directors offer, as opposed to their monitoring and control 
activities.  (Anderson and Reeb 2003: p 211) 
Directors as counselors for firm management.  Board member experience is an 
important indicator of the quality of the advice and counsel they can provide.  The roles 
board members play in their current and previous companies provide the background 
necessary to support the firm.    Such qualities reflect the ability of the director to 
support the firm’s goals.  Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) show that a director’s 
experience contributes to the sales performance of a firm while McDonald et al. (2008) 
show a positive effect of a director’s acquisition experience upon a firm’s acquisition 
performance.    
Directors possess two types of experiences valuable to the firm.  Each director 
possesses firm-specific experience and industry-specific experience.  Both sets of 
experience are valuable to shareholders seeking to provide support for management 
activities.  Firm-specific experience accounts for the tenure the director has on the board 
and will reflect the team experience gained with the other directors and the managers.  
Upper echelons literature suggests such team experiences are valuable as they foster 
shared norms, common goals, organizational routines, coordination, and mutual 
commitment that enhance the efficiency of team decision making (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990).  A director with longer tenure is better equipped to understand firm-
specific strategies and capabilities and will be able to more adequately support the 
CEO’s strategic vision.   
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Industry-specific experience allows directors to be sensitive to critical issues within 
the firm’s industry thus enabling the director to provide the proper guidance to the firm’s 
executives.  When directors gain experience through other industry directorships, they 
are able to accumulate human and relational capital that can be used to support the firm.  
Tenure as a director in the focal firm adds to the industry experience of the director 
specific to the focal firm and facilitates their ability to assess the firm’s strategic 
activities in the context of other industry participants.  Empirical studies have shown that 
more management industry experience leads to higher firm growth (Kor 2003), higher 
sales growth (Kor and Sundaramurthy 2009), higher market valuation during M&A 
activity (McDonald et al. 2008) and a higher likelihood of firm survival (Pennings et al.  
1998).  
The more industry experience directors possess, the more the director can be a 
resource to management facilitating their efforts to maximize firm performance.  This is 
of utmost importance to the steward-led firm. The board’s responsibility is to provide 
guidance to firm executives to maximize firm profitability and firm value.  Under the 
framework of stewardship theory, this charge outweighs the requirement to actively 
monitor management to minimize agency loss.  Therefore, I expect that director 
experience will have an additive effect on the link between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance.  More formally,   
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Director industry experience positively moderates the 
relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.   
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Directors as external resource providers for the firm.  Directors influence a firm’s 
ability to access resources through the board member’s link to the external environment 
(Boyd 1990, Daily and Dalton 1994, Hillman et al. 2000, Johnson et al. 1996, Pearce and 
Zahra 1992).  Corporate boards serve as a firm’s mechanism for managing external 
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), reducing the firm’s environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer 1972), and reducing transaction costs associated with environmental 
interdependency (Williamson 1981).  Moreover, directors bring key strategic resources 
such as information, access to key industry constituents, and legitimacy to the firm 
(Gales and Kesner 1994).   
Whether the resources provided benefit the firm is dependent on whether they 
assist the firm in managing the aforementioned external dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978).  Past research by Daily and Schwenk (1996) and Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) propose that an effective board provides resources that lead to firm profitability.   
Goodstein and Boeker (1991) show some support for the effectiveness of boards in 
resource acquisition while Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) found that in the bankruptcy 
process outside directors provide credibility and legitimacy to their firms leading to firm 
survival.  Consequently, the structure of a firm’s board of directors is a direct reflection 
of the resource needs of the firm to support the strategic actions of the CEO.   A study by 
Jones et al. (2008) found that, in family firms, affiliated directors use their close social 
ties with management to provide them with information from the external business 
environment that reduces the perceived risk of firm strategic actions. Thus, the presence 
of certain directors may confer different resources than other directors. Identifying and 
31 
 
selecting board members that can provide resources to the firm is important to firm 
ownership; it is especially important to a steward-led firm as owners place less 
importance on a board’s monitoring function and emphasize creating a board that can 
provide the structure and environment necessary to support the CEO’s efforts to create 
and maintain a profitable company (Davis et al. 1997). 
Shareholders also value the ability of a board member to maintain or strengthen an 
existing business relationship in a steward-led firm.  Such board members lessen 
information asymmetry between the firm’s executives and potential suppliers in the 
firm’s production value chain.  This promotes a level of trust and facilitates 
collaboration between firms.  Often, such board members are either managers or sit on 
the boards of companies that have existing business relationships with the firm.  These 
board members are “affiliated directors” because they are not deemed independent of 
firm influence based on the existence of a preexisting relationship.  Agency theorists 
regard affiliated directors as non-independent board members (in accordance with SOX) 
and propose that such directors are under the influence of management and cannot be 
trusted to exercise monitoring management with the same vigilance as an outside 
independent director (Dalton et al. 2008).   Shareholders concerned with implementing 
effective controls on management avoid affiliated directors while owners seeking to 
support managers they believe are stewards of the firm embrace affiliated directors.  
Hence, 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4):  The number of affiliated directors positively 
moderates the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance. 
Another avenue for owners of steward-led firms to provide support to management 
via the board of directors is through specialized expertise the director brings to the firm 
(Hillman et al. 2000).  “Support specialists” are decision supporters (Baysinger and 
Zardkoohi 1986) that “provide linkages in specific, identifiable areas that support the 
firm’s strategies but do not form the foundation on which the strategy is built” (Hillman 
et al. 2000: pp. 241). These directors may lack general business management experience 
yet provide specific expertise and insight valuable for firm decision makers (Jones et al. 
2008).  They extend support in specialized areas that require concrete knowledge such as 
law, finance, capital markets, etc.  The primary role of support specialists is to secure 
resources for the firm from outside entities (Jones et al. 2008) and/or provide 
consultative advice that reduces environmental uncertainty (Hillman et al. 2000, Pfeffer 
1972).  For instance, board members that possess backgrounds in finance have been 
found to help gain access to financial capital (Pfeffer 1972, Mizruchi and Stearns 1994, 
Stearns and Mizruchi 1993) while business lawyers provide valuable advice when 
industry regulations change (Hillman et al. 2000).   
Boards structured to support the strategic direction of the steward CEO are more 
likely to have directors who are resources while boards whose primary concern is 
monitoring and control of management place less value on a board member without the 
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business management experience required for effective oversight of the agent CEO.  
Therefore, I propose the following: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5):  The number of directors who are support specialists 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance. 
Directors with community influence are of special value to steward-led firms to 
help assure that the interests of stakeholders outside the competitive product or supply 
markets are not abused or ignored (Hillman et al. 2000).  Such directors include 
politicians, members of the clergy, university faculty and leaders of social or community 
organizations; previous research by Hillman et al. (2000) reveal that these types of 
directors are especially valued during times of environmental uncertainty.  
Acquaah (2007) highlights the need for relationships with community leaders 
showing that communities served by businesses in emerging economies rely heavily on 
informal political systems that influence resource availability to the business operating in 
that environment.  He states “the relationships developed by an organization’s managers 
with community leaders provide the organization with valuable access to resources and 
information as the community leaders endorse the organization and its activities and 
refer it to their communities. This may enable the organization to obtain financial 
resources, enter new market segments or gain access to new customers, and/or acquire 
technological know-how. Thus, community leaders act as links to a broad marketplace, 
connecting organizations with their communities leading to the transmission of valuable 
information and resources (p. 1241).” 
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As a consequence, community influencers who serve as directors provide the firm 
with legitimacy to external constituents, provide expertise about and influence with 
powerful community constituents, and provide an external non-business perspective of 
firm activity (Hillman et al. 2000).  Unlike firms with a principal-agent culture, 
stakeholder cultures that value stewardship principles are concerned with the perceptions 
and valid concerns of legitimate stakeholders such as community constituents (Jones 
Felps and Bigley 2007).  Legitimate stakeholders such as community leaders provide 
access (or restrict access) to customers and resources that lead to firm profitability.  
Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The number of directors that are community leaders 
positively moderates the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I proposed that through a CEO’s socioemotional wealth in their 
firm, CEO stewardship is positively related to firm performance.  Moreover, after a 
review of the family business literature as it relates to stewardship and organizational 
culture, I take a positivist's view of stewardship theory and propose family-owned 
business positively moderate the CEO stewardship–firm performance relationship.  
Finally, to support the normative view of stewardship theory presented, I propose board 
of director characteristics associated with influencing external stakeholders positively 
moderate the CEO stewardship–firm performance relationship as well.  In summary, 
work within this chapter proposes uniting socioemotional wealth with stewardship, 
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extending family business literature’s link to stewardship theory, and creating an 
alternative theory on internal governance by leveraging stewardship and resource 
dependence theories. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The hypotheses in the previous chapter propose a relationship between CEO 
stewardship and firm performance, and moderating effects of family ownership and 
board composition on this relationship.  This chapter describes the research methodology 
used to test these relationships.  First, I describe the study sample and afterward discuss 
measures used in the study.  I close the chapter with description of the methods used to 
test the hypotheses. 
SAMPLE 
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I evaluate a sample of firms from the S&P 
1500 during 2004, 2005, and 2006.  The S&P 1500 was chosen because it accounts for 
85% percent of value of publicly-traded U.S. firms and thus reflects a sample that 
provides broad generalizability to large and medium-sized public corporations.  A 
random sample of 300 firms from the S&P 1500 was selected.  All financial and 
personal CEO data was collected from The Corporate Library, CRSP/Compustat, and 
RiskMetric databases.  Subsequent missing values were collected via a variety of sources 
including company press releases and SEC filings.  Those firm-year combinations 
remaining with incomplete data with respect to the dependent, independent, and control 
variables were dropped from the sample leaving 268 firms and 587 firm-years 
observations.   
 
 
37 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The theory development herein proposes that attributes associating CEO 
stewardship and socioemotional wealth lead to better firm performance.  Measures of 
firm performance in strategy literature are most often based on accounting measures and 
stock market returns.  Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of firm performance in this study 
and is a measure of efficiency that divides firm market value by total assets (Chung and 
Pruitt 1994, Lee and Tomkin 1999).   By using Tobin’s Q, I incorporate investor 
perceptions of firm value (through the use of market value in the calculation) while 
normalizing firm performance measure based upon the firm assets.  Moreover, this 
market-based measure also provides an indication of future firm performance.  The value 
of Tobin’s Q leads the independent and control variables.   As an example, independent 
and control variables collected for the year 2004 (time, t) will have a firm’s Tobin’s Q 
reported from 2005 (t+1). This incorporates a lag of one year between the dependent 
variable and independent variables at the beginning of the time periods expected to 
influence firm performance.   
INDEPENDENT AND MODERATING VARIABLES 
Stewardship Variables 
The socioemotional wealth accumulated by an employee is theorized herein to 
develop and build over time such that the longer an employee’s tenure with a firm, the 
more socioemotional wealth is possessed by the employee.  Time spent with the 
organization allows for the development of an employee’s organizational identity, social 
capital, and informal power that create a high level of socioemotional wealth and lead to 
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behaviors associated with stewardship.  CEOs with high levels of socioemotional wealth 
are theorized to take actions that reflect the CEO’s stewardship of the firm.  Thus, it is 
important to capture and utilize constructs associated with the building blocks of 
socioemotional wealth to describe CEO stewardship.   
CEO director tenure is used to capture the length of time the CEO has been a 
senior employee of the focal firm and serves as a proxy for a CEO’s informal power.  
CEO director tenure not only captures the formal structural power associated with CEO 
tenure (Finkelstein 1992) but also the informal power developed over the span of the 
career as an executive officer (and/or senior advisor) with the current firm.  A negative 
value for this variable indicates that the CEO was not a member of the board of directors 
for a specific length of time.  Three firm-year observations have negative values for 
CEO director tenure. 
Social capital in the context of socioemotional wealth reflects the leveraging of 
personal business relationships that develop over the tenure of employment of the CEO.  
Past research has linked social capital with CEO attributes closely associated with 
human capital such as education level, elite education alumni, formal training, etc. 
(Belliveau et al. 1996).  However, since the consequence of social capital in professional 
settings of top management teams is often the number of board directorates, I define a 
CEO’s social capital based upon the network that develops as the CEO ascends into an 
executive role.  This measure is consistent with Florin et al.’ (2003) measure of the 
CEO’s personal network and D’Aveni’s (1990) use of the number of corporate boards 
sat on by the CEO to develop a top management team status construct.  
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The CEO’s organizational identity was constructed by conducting content analysis 
of the annual letter to shareholder authored by the CEO in the firm’s annual report.  Past 
research in strategic management has shown that content analysis is a useful tool to 
capture the managerial cognition, perceptions, and beliefs of executives who have 
limited accessibility (D’Aveni and MacMillan 1990, Duriau et al. 2007, Short and 
Palmer 2008).   
The shareholder letter was content analyzed via DICTION 5.0 (Hart 2000).  
DICTION was designed to focus on the subtleties of word count, word choice, and tone-
based linguistics theory in the field of communications (Hart, 1984).   The software 
package contains 31 predefined dictionaries containing over 10,000 words that can be 
used to analyze any text, including those from business texts such as annual reports, 
mission statements, speeches, and press releases.  The Commonality master variable 
score is used to reflect the CEO’s organizational identity.  The Commonality master 
variable is one of five master variables used by DICTION to analyze text.  “This 
variable examines language that highlights agreed-on values of a group and rejects 
idiosyncratic modes of engagement [and] may be useful to validate the assertions of 
strategy scholars who have suggested that communitarian characterizations will become 
increasingly popular in the strategic discourses of organizations (Short and Palmer 2008, 
p 732).”  
The normal range for the Commonality score in DICTION 5.0 is 46.86 to 52.28.  
The Commonality score range of the sample’s mean (50.55) and approximately +/- 1 
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standard deviation (2.18) falls within the normal range of analyzed texts using 
DICTION.   
Family-owned Business Variables 
Measures of family-owned businesses are required to test this economic 
organizational form’s influence upon the impact of socioemotional wealth (stewardship).  
This study incorporates the  definition of  family ownership percentage  by Miller et al. 
(2007) whereby a family firm is one where “multiple members of the same family are 
involved as major owners or managers, either contemporaneously or over time” (p. 836). 
The definition used in this study incorporates a family ownership percentage over 1% 
and the presence of at least one family member as a director or executive of the firm.  
Firms that meet these criteria (family blockholder ownership over 1%) will have their 
family’s ownership percentage used as a primary variable of interest (Miller et al. 2007).  
This variable is coded as a continuous numerical value from 0.00 to 1.00.  
Moreover, the model will include a family CEO variable that is defined as whether 
the firm’s CEO is the founder, parent or sibling of the founder, or a direct descendent of 
the founder.  This variable is coded as a dichotomous variable whereby a value of “1” 
reflects the aforementioned definition and “0” for CEOs who were not deemed to meet 
the definition.  These data were collected from the focal firm’s SEC filings (10-K, 
DEF14A). 
Board of Director Composition  
To test the impact of board of director characteristics on the relationship between a 
CEO’s socioemotional wealth and a firm’s-long term performance, the total amount of 
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director industry experience is included in the model, which serves as a proxy for the 
knowledge-based resources provided by the board to the firm’s CEO (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003).   This variable is the summation of each director’s experience as a 
member on the top management team (as listed in the focal firm’s annual report and SEC 
filings) in any firm that operates in the same industries as the focal firm as defined by the 
first two digits of the primary and secondary SIC codes of the focal firm (McDonald et 
al. 2008).  This measure also captures the total amount of the board’s social capital 
through the personal networks of the directors as defined by Florin et al. (2003).   
The number of board members who are considered by the SEC to be affiliated 
directors is theorized to influence the resource access of the focal firm through its 
business partnerships (Jones et al. 2008).  Meanwhile, the number of support specialist 
directors and community influencer directors are included to test the hypotheses 
concerning the provision of resources by such directors to the firm’s executive 
management.  Support specialist directors include bankers, lawyers, public relations 
specialists, and insurance company representatives; these types of director are thought to 
provide legitimacy for the firm, provide expertise to management, and provide access to 
capital markets and government decision makers (Hillman et al, 2000).  Community 
influencers, on the other hand, provide non-business expertise concerning operating in 
the business environment; these types of directors include politicians, clergy, academics, 
and community/civic leaders (Hillman et al, 2000).   
42 
 
Each firm director is coded dichotomously for each director classification (as the 
classifications are not exclusive) and the sum of each type of director for each firm is 
calculated for inclusion in the empirical model. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Control variables included in proposed model must account for firm characteristics 
and measures commonly used in corporate governance literature.  All of the following 
variables were collected in databases such as RiskMetrics, CRSP, Compustat, and The 
Corporate Library or from the focal firm’s SEC filings.  Firm characteristics included in 
the models are firm size, as measured by the annual sales of the company, and firm age 
as the number of years since the firm was founded. A relative industry performance 
variable is also included to control for firm stock market performance specific to the 
industry of each sample firm.  This variable is calculated as the difference between the 
focal firm’s year-end stock market price and the focal firm’s industry median year-end 
stock price within the focal firms leading 2-digit SIC industry.  All data for this variable 
was sourced through the combined CRSP/Compustat database.  CEO age is also 
included in the model as risk aversion in older CEOs may impact firm performance.  
Corporate governance variables are used to control for the impact of agency theory 
prescriptions on CEO activities that are theorized to reduce agency costs and increase the 
firm performance.  To control for internal governance prescriptions six common controls 
are included.  The number of board members and number of board meetings are included 
to capture the ability and actions taken to monitor a firm’s CEO, respectively (Dalton et 
al. 1999).   The motivation to monitor the CEO is theorized to be directly linked to board 
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independence and is measured by the percentage of outside board members (Walsh and 
Seward 1990).  Conversely, independent or not, many directors are entrenched board 
members based upon the staggered election cycle for blocks of directors. This ensures 
the entire board cannot be replaced en mass based upon poor management oversight or 
subpar firm performance.  The level of board entrenchment as represented by a 
dichotomous staggered board variable (where a value of “1” signifies the existence of a 
staggered board) is included to capture whether mechanisms are in place to reduce 
director entrenchment and align the efforts of a firm’s directors with the firm’s owners 
(Dalton et al., 2008 reviews the impact of staggered boards in firm governance).  Finally, 
a measure of CEO power over the board, CEO duality, requires inclusion to capture the 
consequences of firm monitoring being lead by the person requiring the monitoring 
(Fama and Jensen 1983, Finkelstein 1992, Mizruchi 1983). Likewise, the presence of 
the company founder as CEO and/or Board Chairperson also influences the goal 
alignment of firm management and is theorized to align the interests of the principal 
(often the founder) and the agent, especially if they are one and the same (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).    
Seven external governance mechanisms associated with the goal alignment of 
manager to those of firm ownership are included in the proposed model as well.  The 
impact of the executive compensation system is controlled for with the inclusion of the 
following variables.  Annual cash compensation for the CEO is included to capture the 
influence of annual short-term pay on long-term firm performance and is the sum of the 
annual salary and annual bonus of the CEO (Finkelstein and Boyd 1998).  The variable 
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compensation ratio is a ratio of a CEO’s base salary to the sum of value of all variable 
compensation such as bonuses, stock, stock options, and other compensation tied to firm 
performance.  This variable controls the impact of variable compensation as a 
mechanism to align CEO actions to firm performance (Core et al. 2003).  To measure 
and control for the accumulated impact of stock options, the value of unexercised 
exercisable stock options and the value of unexercisable options is included in the 
proposed model (Hall 2000).  The impact of ownership as an external governance 
measure is also included in the model tested (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  CEO 
ownership percentage and insider ownership percentage account for the goal alignment 
of the CEO, top management team, and directors by ensuring they carry similar 
ownership risk as the firm’s stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   Controlling for 
the monitoring activities of institutional owners is captured by the percent of 
institutional ownership; large ownership stakes by such owners often lead to increased 
motivation to monitor the activities of management (Dalton et al. 2008).    
Finally, governance mechanisms commonly associated with the market for 
corporate control are aggregated in the Gompers et al.  (2003) governance index.  This 
index accounts for such management corporate control measures as poison pills, golden 
parachutes, greenmail, super majority votes, etc.  The lower the number in the 
governance index, the better the corporate governance of the firm with respect to 
ownership rights and managerial power. 
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ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The hypotheses in this dissertation examine the relationships between CEO stewardship, 
family firm ownership and control, board of director composition, and firm performance.  
Data to test these hypotheses span from 2004 to 2006 (inclusive).  Longitudinal data is 
important because it provides more power to detect causal relationships (Bergh 1993, 
Bergh and Holbein 1997), especially whether a relationship is stable or fluctuates over 
time.  Likewise, longitudinal data is more robust against providing spurious relationships 
that may occur when using cross-sectional data and can be used to show how variables 
co-vary (Hitt et al. 1998).  In addition, use of longitudinal data improves overall 
estimates by decreasing multicollinearity (Certo and Semadeni 2006), increases sample 
size and power, and controls for unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi 1995, Hitt et al. 
1998).   
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not appropriate for analyzing a 
longitudinal dataset as panel data often violate assumptions regarding the error terms be 
random, independent, normally distributed, and have a constant variance (Bergh and 
Holbein 1997; Certo and Semadeni 2006).  Likewise, the error terms are time-specific 
heteroskedastic whereby the non-costant errors introduce bias the standard errors and 
increases the likelihood of a Type I error even though the slope estimates are still 
unbiased (Bergh 1993, Bergh and Holbein 1997).  The standard error may also be biased 
due to autocorrelation in the error terms.   
Fixed effects and random effects models are recommended methods for analyzing 
panel data as they produce unbiased estimates that correct for heterogeneity.  Fixed 
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effects models investigate differences in intercepts while holding slopes and constants 
fixed across groups of observations. Unlike the fixed effects model, with random effects 
models the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the 
independent variables included in the model.  Often random effects models are used 
when there is reason to believe that differences across entities have some influence on 
the dependent variable.  In addition, models that include invariant variables should use 
random effects modeling (Greene 1995, Sanders 2001).   I used the Hausman 
specification test to evaluate the reasonable choice to use random effects models, given 
my panel data includes invariant variables (Hausman, 1978).  As anticipated, the 
Hausman test revealed using a random effects model to test my hypotheses is a better 
choice (p > 0.05) than using a fixed effects model.   
Since each firm could share directors and most directors hold multiple 
directorships, the residuals for dyads that included the same director could be correlated. 
To correct for non-independence of observations resulting from observation clustering, 
we estimated robust standard errors in our model (Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001; StataCorp, 
2005).  Since both firm- and time-specific effects are most likely present, a panel 
estimation procedure (Chamberlain 1982) including a White heteroskedasticity-
consistent variance-covariance matrix is used (White 1980).  Year dummy variables are 
also included to eliminate year-specific heterogeneity (Bergh 1993).  
To ensure this study can be used to draw inferences with respect to temporal 
causality, the independent and control variables are lagged by 1-year with respect to the 
dependent variable.   Post hoc analysis for potential of reverse causality in the study’s 
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statistically significant relationships are conducted and reported later in this dissertation.  
Additionally, variables that are highly correlated to one another (r >0.60) and all 
variables included in interaction terms were centered at the grand mean to minimize 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991). Post-estimation diagnostics reveal minimal 
evidence of multicollinearity in the tested empirical models.   
SUMMARY 
The present chapter provides information regarding the methodology used to test 
the hypotheses in Chapter II.  Data is collected and managed as described in the chapter.  
Chapter IV presents the variable content of each model and the results of the model 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the hypotheses expressed in Chapter II.  
Descriptive statistics of the variable and correlations are presented first.  Afterward, the 
results of the hypotheses are discussed.   
Table 3 presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients and Table 4 present the 
means and standard deviations. The normality and skewness of all variables were 
analyzed; variables were transformed (as applicable) as described in Chapter III.  Tables 
5-7 display the results of the forward-stepwise, multiple-regression model for pooled 
cross-sectional panel data using random effects and robust standard errors.  Table 8 
summarizes the results based upon the full hypothesized model (Model 8).   
 Model 1 contains the control variables commonly associated with agency theory 
research.  The results from Model 1 support previous research in corporate governance. 
CEO STEWARDSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
I propose a positive relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.  
Model 2 adds the socioemotional wealth variables proposed to be related to CEO 
stewardship to the control variable only model reflected in Model 1.   The results shown 
in Model 2 of Table 1 suggest that the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
performance is not statistically significant.  CEO board memberships (-0.006, p > 0.10), 
CEO organizational identity (-0.000, p > 0.10), and CEO board tenure    (-0.003, p > 
0.10) do not have a statistically significant relationship to the firm performance in Model 
2.  Therefore, these results do not support Hypothesis 1 (H1).   
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FAMILY OWNERSHIP, CEO STEWARDSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that family ownership and control positively moderates 
the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.  Following Aiken and 
West (1991) the family ownership percentage and family CEO variables are added to 
Model 2; Model 3 reflects this addition.  Of note, family ownership percentage (0.517, p 
> 0.10) does not have a statistically significant relationship to firm performance and 
firms lead by family CEOs (-0.256, p > 0.10) are shown to have a negative statistically 
significant relationship to firm performance.   
Next, the interaction terms are created from the appropriate hypothesized grand 
mean centered first-order variables (Aiken and West, 1991) and entered into Model 4.  
When examining the influence of family firm ownership and control constructs upon the 
relationship between theorized stewardship variables and firm performance, only a 
single interaction effect was statistically significant.  Increased family firm ownership 
strengthens the relationship between the quantity of CEO directorships and firm 
performance as shown in Model 4 (0.343, p < 0.05).  This result remains robust (0.402,   
p < 0.05) in the model incorporating all hypothesized relationships in this dissertation 
(Model 8); Figure 2 displays a graphical representation of this relationship based on the 
results from Model 8.  Results from Model 4 and Model 8 marginally support 
Hypothesis 2. 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, CEO STEWARDSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The remaining hypotheses in this dissertation examine the influence of board of 
director characteristics on the relationship between CEO stewardship and firm 
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performance.  It is interesting to note that in the control variable only model (Model 1) 
the quantity of board members is negatively related to firm performance (-0.033, p 
<0.01) even though agency theory would suggest increased monitoring would lead to a 
positive relationship between quantity of board members and firm performance.   
 Following Aiken and West (1991) the cumulative director experience and the 
quantity of board members that are affiliated directors, community influential directors, 
and support directors are added to Model 2; Model 5 reflects this addition.  The results 
from Model 5 reveal that there is not a statistically significant relationship between firm 
performance and the cumulative amount of director experience (-0.001, p > 0.10), the 
quantity of affiliated directors (-0.025, p > 0.10), the quantity of community influential 
directors (0.009, p > 0.10), and the quantity of support directors (-0.019, p > 0.10).   
The interaction terms created from the appropriate hypothesized grand mean 
centered first-order variables (Aiken and West, 1991) entered into Model 6 to test the 
hypothesized relationships (H3, H4, H5, and H6).   
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that director industry experience positively moderates the 
relationship between CEO stewardship and firm performance.  As Model 6 reveals, there 
lacks a statistically significant influence of director experience on the relationship 
between the stewardship constructs and firm performance.  These results remain robust 
in the model incorporating all hypothesized relationships in this dissertation (Model 8).  
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 (H3) is not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 states the quantity of affiliated directors present on a firm’s board 
positively moderates the CEO stewardship – firm performance relationship.  It appears 
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that the number of affiliated directors a firm possesses on its board positively moderates 
the relationship between the quantity of directorships a CEO holds and firm performance 
(0.033, p < 0.01).  Likewise, Model 6 shows that the quantity of affiliated directors is a 
positive marginally statistically significant moderator of the relationship between CEO 
board tenure and firm performance (0.002, p < 0.10).  The influence of the quantity of 
affiliated directors on the relationship between CEO organizational identity and firm 
performance is not statistically significant (0.000, p > 0.10).  The positive moderation of 
the number of affiliated directors on the relationship between the quantity of 
directorships a CEO holds and firm performance remain robust (0.027, p < 0.05) in the 
model incorporating all hypothesized relationships in this dissertation (Model 8).  Figure 
3 displays a graphical representation of this relationship based on the results from Model 
8.  The other relationships used to test Hypothesis 4 are not statistically significant in 
Model 8.  Therefore, Hypothesis 4 receives marginal support.    
Hypothesis 5 suggests the quantity of support specialists a firm’s board possesses 
positively moderates the CEO stewardship – firm performance relationship.  Model 6 
reveals a single marginally statistically significant moderating effect.  It appears the 
number of support directors on a board marginally negatively moderates the relationship 
between CEO board memberships and firm performance (-0.010, p < 0.10).   Otherwise, 
a statistically significant influence of the quantity of support specialists on the 
relationship between the remaining stewardship constructs and firm performance is 
lacking.  The marginally statistically significant moderating effect of the number of 
support directors on the relationship between CEO board memberships and firm 
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performance do not remain robust in the model incorporating all hypothesized 
relationships in this dissertation (Model 8).  The relationships used to test Hypothesis 5 
are not statistically significant in Model 8.  The totality of the results testing the 
aforementioned moderating effects provides no support for Hypothesis 5 (H5).  
Hypothesis 6 predicts the quantity of community influential directors a firm’s 
board possesses positively moderates the CEO stewardship – firm performance 
relationship.  Model 6 reveals positive statistically significant moderating effects for the 
influence of the quantity of community influential directors on the relationship between 
CEO board memberships and firm performance (0.010, p < 0.05), and the relationship 
between CEO organizational identity and firm performance (0.008, p < 0.05).   The 
influence of the quantity of community influential directors on the relationship between 
CEO board tenure and firm performance is not significant (-0.000, p > 0.10).  The results 
from Model 6 with respect to H6 are robust in the model incorporating all hypothesized 
relationships in this dissertation (Model 8).  Figure 4 displays a graphical representation 
of the influence of the quantity of community influential directors on the relationship 
between CEO board memberships and firm performance based on the results from 
Model 8.  Figure 5 displays a graphical representation of the influence of the quantity of 
community influential directors on the relationship between CEO organizational identity 
and firm performance based on the results from Model 8.  Given the results of Model 6 
and Model 8, there is strong support for Hypothesis 6 (H6). 
In addition, the interaction effects introduced in Model 8 produced a significant 
∆R². 
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POST HOC ANALYSIS 
A recent article by Henley et al. (2006) highlights the possibility of developing 
equivalent models whereby ambiguous directional causality undermines the 
interpretation of an empirical study.  Therefore, the statistically significant results 
presented in Model 8 that support the hypotheses in this dissertation are tested for 
reverse causality to determine whether past firm performance is an antecedent to the 
statistically significant interaction effects. The statistically significant interaction 
variable is placed as the dependent variable in a model that includes the Tobin’s Q from 
the year proceeding the year of interest for the remaining covariates, the control 
variables, the primary variables of interest, and the remaining theorized interactions.  As 
an example, the independent, control, and interaction variables collected for the year 
2004 (time, t) will have a firm’s Tobin’s Q reported from 2003 (t-1). This incorporates a 
lag of one year between firm performance and the remaining dependent and independent 
variables to test whether firm performance is an antecedent to strengthened relationships 
between CEO stewardship and family firm ownership, and CEO stewardship and board 
of director characteristics.   
No empirical model testing reverse causality is found to have a statistically 
significant relationship between Tobin’s Q (1-year lag) and the interaction relationship 
used as the dependent variable. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presents empirical evidence that evaluates the relationship between 
CEO stewardship and firm performance, and the moderating effect of family ownership 
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and control, and board of director characteristics on the CEO stewardship – firm 
performance relationship.  I found no support for a direct relationship between CEO 
stewardship and firm performance; likewise, support for the positive moderating effect 
of family ownership and control was marginal.  The single supported relationship 
involving family firms was an increase in family firm ownership strengthens the 
relationship between the quantity of CEO directorships and firm performance.    
The influence of board-of-director characteristics produced a number of significant 
results.  The number of affiliated directors a firm possesses on its board positively 
moderates the relationship between the quantity of directorships a CEO holds and firm 
performance; the quantity of community influential directors positively moderates the 
relationship between CEO board memberships and firm performance, and the 
relationship between CEO organizational identity and firm performance.   
In the next chapter I discuss these results and how they contribute to corporate 
governance and strategic management. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The dominant theory of corporate governance in management and finance is 
agency theory.   An agency relationship exists whenever one individual, the principal, 
depends on the actions of another, the agent.  When a firm’s owner hires managers to 
run the firm, the owner has relinquished control of the firm to the manager and 
establishes a principal-agent relationship.  The principal’s primary concern is that 
information asymmetry concerning the quality of the agent and the actions of the agent 
will create agency costs associated with the principal-agent relationship.  Moreover, the 
goals and risk profile of the agent may be different from the principal’s, thus the actions 
most desired by the principle may be not be similar to agent activity used to manage the 
firm.  Efforts to minimize agency loss in the principal-agent relationship have motivated 
scholars and practitioners to develop prescriptions to align the interests of principals 
with their agents, specifically the shareholder-executive relationship of the modern 
corporation.   
The attempt to develop contracts ex-ante via compensation practices such as 
increased cash payments, conferring equity stakes, generous pension plans, lucrative 
terms of management exit and variable compensation schemes such as stock options 
appear to have results that are inconsistent.  Likewise, attempts to establish external 
ownership stakes and internal oversight through the board of directors to deter moral 
hazard via increased monitoring have had mixed results as well.  The agency costs of 
establishing such ex-ante activities are expensive and costly to shareholders if they are 
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ineffective.   Given the equivocal efficacy of such practices, the development of a viable 
alternative to agency theory prescription is a prudent course of action for corporate 
governance scholars.  While other corporate governance theories have explanatory 
power (resource dependency and stakeholder theory), they do not provide a theoretical 
backdrop that challenges the dominant assumption that the interests of principals and 
their agents are misaligned.  Stewardship theory provides an alternative to the economic 
man model that so heavily relies upon self-interest as a divisive influence on the 
principal-agent relationship. 
This dissertation represents an attempt to expand upon the foundation developed in 
past corporate governance research by incorporating stewardship as a complement to 
agency theory.   Early in this dissertation, I address the underlying assumptions of 
agency theory and stewardship theory.  While they appear diametrically opposed to one 
another, if one views each theory on a behavioral continuum whereby the applicability 
of the goal misalignment assumption drives the efficacy of each theory’s explanatory 
power, both the agency model and the stewardship model can adequately describe the 
principal-agent/steward relationship.    
This contingency assumption advances the two agendas in this dissertation.  First, 
the use of stewardship theory in modeling managerial attributes requires the 
development of constructs specific to managerial stewardship.  I suggest that 
socioemotional wealth provides a foundation for stewardship construct development.  
Second, situational contexts must be identified where managerial stewardship is more 
57 
 
likely than managerial opportunism.  I suggest that family firm ownership and board of 
directors provide such a context and developed a theoretical case for each.  
Likewise, the contingency assumption drives the composition of the empirical 
model tested herein by requiring the inclusion of common corporate governance 
variables in addition to newly developed stewardship constructs based upon the 
theoretical decomposition of the socioemotional wealth construct.  As a consequence, we 
have an empirical model that controls for agency-related issues while testing the 
stewardship constructs impact on firm performance.   
The results from this dissertation assist us in better understanding the effects of 
CEO stewardship, family firm ownership and control, and board of director 
characteristics on firm performance.  The rest of this chapter proceeds in the following 
manner.  The first section discusses the findings of the study while the second section of 
the chapter examines the conclusions and implications of the results.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of study limitations and areas of future inquiry. 
DISCUSSION 
CEO Stewardship and Firm Performance 
This research hypothesized a positive relationship between CEO stewardship and 
firm performance.  Based on family business studies linking CEO attributes and 
activities associated with stewardship, this study posits CEO stewardship leads to 
increased firm performance.  CEO stewardship is defined by constructs developed from 
the research on socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). 
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The results from the theorized empirical model are mixed.  The initial inferred 
assumption that CEO board memberships, CEO director tenure, and CEO organizational 
identity are related to one another based upon the definition of socioemotional wealth 
was not borne out based upon the results in the correlation matrix and subsequent testing 
using confirmatory factor analysis (see Table 9).  This is not entirely surprising given the 
constructs are archival and should be free from any influence from common method 
bias.  Each construct is included together to test the CEO stewardship – firm 
performance relationship.  However, no main effect of CEO board memberships, CEO 
director tenure, and CEO organizational identity on firm performance is found.  Given 
the lack of main effects, perhaps CEO stewardship (as reflected by the use of 
socioemotional wealth constructs) influences firm performance in specific contexts.  
Results testing the moderation effects of family firm ownership and control and board-
of-director characteristics bear this out.   CEO board memberships is the stewardship 
construct that is consistently linked to increased firm performance when tested in the 
context of family firm and firm board-of-director characteristics.  CEO organizational 
identity enhances firm performance when tested in the context of firm board-of-director 
characteristics, as well. 
Likewise, the significant ∆R² between Model 7 (family ownership & control and 
director characteristics main effects) and Model 8 (the proposed interaction effects) 
strengthens the broad assertion that stewardship attributes have a positive interaction 
effect on firm performance, suggesting the impact of stewardship is context specific. 
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Family Ownership, CEO Stewardship, and Firm Performance 
Family ownership’s positive influence on the relationship between CEO board 
memberships and firm performance supports the claim within family business literature 
that family-owned businesses conduct more external reputation development especially 
in their business customer and supplier channels (Miller and LeBreton-Miller 2006, 
Miller et al. 2008).  Board memberships are often a result of longstanding relationships 
between the firm managers and board members, and the director.  An increased amount 
of directorships held by the CEO reflects the breadth of such relationships; these 
relationships help the CEO positively influence the external environment for firm 
benefit.  Likewise, these positive influences may be consequences of the relationships 
developed on other firm boards.  Since “most of the commerce in the real world is 
conducted in longstanding relationships, and most production takes place in long-lived 
business institutions…, these arrangements not only reduce contracting and monitoring 
costs, they build trust, [and] facilitate the flow of information…” that leads to more 
profitable business arrangements (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985, p 16).  The increased 
profitability translates into performance that is valued by the equity marketplace. 
While not formally hypothesized, also notable is the negative association with 
FOBs lead by a family member and firm performance.  While there is a direct test of this 
relationship, the interaction results also support conclusions in a study by Sirmon et al. 
(2008).  In this dissertation, the positive interaction between CEO board memberships 
and family ownership in combination with the lack of a resulting relationship between 
CEO board memberships and the family CEO can be interpreted as firm performance in 
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family firms is positively influenced by CEOs if they are not a family member.    Sirmon 
et al. (2008) conclude family ownership positively influences long-term strategic actions 
such as research and development spending and international expansion; conversely, an 
increase in family control leads to “groupthink” and “strategic simplicity” that hampers 
the nimbleness of firms to react to a changing competitive landscape (Sirmon et al. 
2008).  Like Sirmon et al. (2008), this study’s findings suggest firms benefit from family 
ownership because family ownership lessens the goal incongruence and  information 
asymmetry that leads to increased agency costs as reflected in firm performance.   
Conversely, direct family management as CEO may hamper the ability of management 
to develop new, diverse ideas and lessen the firm’s ability to innovate in product markets 
because of groupthink and organizational rigidity. 
Board Characteristics, CEO Stewardship, and Firm Performance 
The association between CEO board memberships and firm performance is 
positively influenced by board of director attributes associated with external 
partnerships.  An increase in CEO directorships combined with an increase in affiliated 
directors could reflect the CEO’s efforts to manage the relationships of business partners 
by exchanging board seats on each firm’s board.  This becomes more likely when each 
partner knows that the other cannot risk an adverse encounter that damages the firm’s 
reputation, even if the firm’s self-serving actions are economically reasonable.  The 
reduction of information asymmetry between the CEOs engaged in dyadic firm 
partnerships promote a level of trust and collaboration not likely in more adversarial 
business relationships that solely focus on “the bottom line.” 
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Similar logic applies to the positive influence of community influential directors on 
the CEO board membership-firm performance relationship.  The steward CEO also 
properly manages all important stakeholders to ensure maximum benefit for firm 
shareholders.  The access and influence of community leaders in the business 
environment on behalf of the firm should strengthen when the firm’s management 
(specifically the CEO) has a reputation of being trustworthy.  Mahoney et al. (1994) 
argue that reputation and trust are necessary for a firm to operate profitably in the 
marketplace.  “The social relationship is thus the relationship which must be society’s 
basic socioeconomic tool” (Mahoney et al. 1994, p 157). Both formal and informal 
political systems rely upon trust to develop relationships that produce greater resource 
availability to the firm and legitimacy within the marketplace; in this manner, the firm 
increases the probability of higher firm profitability (Acquaah 2007).  Community 
leaders associated with the firm provide the social relationships and are actors in the 
political systems that allow the steward CEO to positively influence firm performance. 
Likewise, the CEO’s outward communication of their personal organizational 
identity positively influences firm performance through the additional support of 
community influential directors.  Community leaders can champion the communal 
messages communicated by the CEO in the marketplace, adding increased legitimacy 
that translates into more customers, favorable terms when negotiating with government 
entities, etc.  The steward CEO’s communication of a common purpose signals lower 
goal and risk incongruence to shareholders if community leaders support the veracity of 
the CEO’s goal alignment and risk profile.  Thus, community influential directors 
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provide the firm with legitimacy to external constituents, exert positive influence on 
powerful community constituents (Hillman et al. 2000), and amplify the CEO’s personal 
identification with the firm to external stakeholders.   
The lack of results with respect to certain theorized constructs need to be 
examined.  The lack of support for the effects of CEO board tenure is unexpected.   The 
construct is theorized to be positively associated with firm performance because many 
CEOs partially base their identity on continued, lengthy association with the firms they 
lead.  Since CEO board tenure may be a construct with explanatory power with respect 
to agency and stewardship theories, its relationship to firm performance may vary based 
upon factors that move along the agent-steward continuum.  For instance, CEO board 
tenure use with respect to agency theory may signal a significant level of undesirable 
power that allows a CEO to act opportunistically; future corporate malfeasance studies 
using the construct may bear this out.  Conversely, lengthy board tenure may provide 
social rewards and serve as an incentive for performing well on behalf of the firm 
(Arrow, 1985).  Nevertheless, in this dissertation, there lacked statistical evidence of 
either theory in the main or moderating effects tested. 
Surprisingly, director attributes such as director experience and the quantity of 
support directors yielded no statistically significant effects.  Resource dependence theory 
suggests that both constructs should have positive effects on firm profitability,   
especially when combined with a steward CEO.  However, results were not forthcoming.  
These findings suggest that director experience matters little in firm performance and 
influences few factors associated with stewardship.  Perhaps this is because director 
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experience has become commoditized to the point where every firm possesses the 
required expertise gained through years of experience by the directors that support firm 
management.  Moreover, the cumulative quantity of experience may not be as important 
as the type of experience and the utilization of that experience by the focal firm.   
Likewise, the presence of support directors on boards may be commoditized as 
well.  A public firm may have a banker or investor on the board because this is their 
pipeline to funding sources, whether at IPO or as an established company with 
institutional owners protecting their investment.  Discerning the likelihood of possessing 
a source of funding, its influence on other factors associated with stewardship, and firm 
performance may be futile given the commoditization of funding in the public capital 
markets.   
Firm Performance Revisited  
Statistically non-significant effects may be a symptom of how the dependent 
variable is defined.  Potentially, firm performance as defined by Tobin’s Q is not the 
proper dependent variable to test stewardship theory relationships.  Davis et al. (1997) 
and Donaldson (1990) refer to firm value as being maximized by steward CEOs.  The 
use of market-based data such as share price or market capitalization may be a more 
appropriate dependent variable given the focus of Davis et al. (1997) and Donaldson 
(1990) on firm value.  In addition, they also allude to a long-term measure of 
performance.  While there is an ongoing debate with respect to defining long-term 
performance, Tobin’s Q is often considered a short-term performance metric.  Therefore, 
the use of Tobin’s Q as a performance metric may decouple the theoretical description of 
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firm performance (as long term) from the construct being used to define firm 
performance.  Perhaps future inquiries using different time lag structures are required to 
allow for the theorized effects to materialize.  The construct validity of long-term value 
or long-term performance as a dependent variable may preclude the proper testing of 
stewardship (socioemotional wealth) to firm performance. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH 
The results from this study have several implications for future research in 
corporate governance.  First, results suggest that stewardship theory research can and 
should be conducted.  While this assertion seems simplistic at face value, the dearth of 
stewardship research is troubling given that the prescriptions used to monitor, control, 
and incent managers are not consistently efficacious.  Even Michael Jensen (2009) 
publicly laments the trend that started based upon his work to have principals rely on 
variable-equity compensation to align managerial incentives when it has become 
increasingly clear that such practice also introduces moral hazard among managers.  
While it is admittedly naïve to believe that monitoring, control, and incentive alignment 
have a minimal place in corporate governance practice, current research focuses almost 
exclusively upon the bad acts of a relatively few managers that lead to agency 
prescriptions for the masses.  If Ghoshal and Moran (1996) are correct, the development 
of “new and better” alignment and monitoring techniques may only lead to agency loss 
in a different and more devious manner.   
Moreover, reducing agency costs is but one side of maximizing shareholder returns 
as this assumption infers static firm values given a set of managerial actions.  While 
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identifying CEOs operating as stewards should also minimize agency costs because of 
the lessened need to use agency prescriptions, identifying these CEOs can also increase 
the opportunities of firms to increase their revenues (Davis et al. 1997).  Jones and 
Wicks (1999) remind us that firms whose managers establish and maintain cooperative 
relationships with stakeholders will achieve competitive advantage over those whose 
managers do not.  Competitive advantage leads to increased revenues and/or lower 
monetary costs.  These revenues may materialize through increased sales and decreased 
costs of goods and services.   
Consequently, the second implication from this study is to provide a reasonable 
context for which corporate governance research can expand beyond the almost 
exclusive lens of agency theory.  This study provides a complementary view by 
incorporating agency theory and stewardship theory in a managerial behavior continuum 
that may provide a more holistic approach to describing manager behavior and 
prescribing corporate governance solutions to fit a broader range of contexts.  For 
instance, this study provides the dual contexts of an “external control perspective” in the 
context of family firm ownership and an “internal control perspective” of the firm’s 
board of directors.  Both corporate governance mechanisms can be used to support 
trustworthy steward managers.    
The results in this dissertation reveal that both perspectives positively influence 
firm performance concurrently.  Thus, both governance perspectives provide solutions to 
the primary concern of maximizing firm performance and may be one of many examples 
where scholars and practitioners can craft strategic solutions to corporate governance 
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problems facing firm shareholders.  As an example, results from this study strongly 
imply that maximizing firm performance through the board of directors can occur by 
providing the CEO the opportunity to hold many directorships in conjunction with 
having directors for the firm that provide the CEO access to external stakeholders.   
LIMITATIONS 
 This study is not without its limitations.  A necessary requirement to conduct this 
study is the selection of variables that are not commonly associated with agency theory 
research yet are theoretically linked to stewardship.  This condition creates two 
problems.  First, if I am creating an empirical model based upon conditional 
assumptions, I should only use variables associated with the theory in use and the 
practical context.  As a consequence, the models herein test agency and stewardship 
effects simultaneously instead of as applicable in the theoretical context.  This makes it 
very difficult to disentangle the effects and interpret them.  Second, the variables are 
linked to stewardship through the use of the socioemotional wealth construct instead of 
as constructs independently associated with stewardship.  Of course, this is the point of 
this entire exercise; we must develop constructs related (in some way) to stewardship 
and independent of agency theory.  The use of socioemotional wealth in developing such 
constructs may be the most parsimonious manner in which to empirically model 
stewardship. 
Likewise, while a compelling case can be made that socioemotional wealth is 
linked to stewardship behavior in managers, a case can be made that socioemotional 
wealth can create situations that require agency prescriptions.  In fact, Gomez-Mejia et al 
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(2007) suggest that the preservation of socioemotional wealth is associated with adverse 
economic outcomes related to risk seeking.  Nevertheless, the context described in that 
study was narrow and the contribution from the study suggested that there are instances 
where the risk aversion assumption of family business is not valid.  An additional issue 
related to the Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) study theorized in this dissertation is that 
stewardship (through socioemotional wealth) increases firm performance even though 
the Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) study suggests negative firm performance consequences 
of socioemotional wealth.  This may provide an explanation for the lack of significant 
main effects and mixed significant results of the moderating effects.  
An additional limitation of this dissertation is its reliance upon archival data to 
measure stewardship and socioemotional wealth.  An alternative manner to establish 
stewardship (socioemotional wealth) constructs is by collecting survey data from 
executives.  However, such a study is likely to have participation issues, response bias 
issues associated with the type of respondents, and concern about the veracity of their 
responses based upon a high desire to manage their public image; this may preclude the 
collection of primary data (D’Aveni and MacMillan 1990, Duriau et al. 2007, Short and 
Palmer 2008).  Image management may also influence the utility of the CEO 
commonality variable even though previous research using shareholder letters suggests it 
is not a problem.     
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation attempts to make several contributions to corporate governance 
theory.  An important contribution from this study is the theoretical foundation that is 
68 
 
laid for future empirical research using constructs associated with socioemotional wealth 
and the stewardship of an individual (in our case, the CEO).   While this may be one of 
the initial studies that attempts to develop constructs for CEO stewardship, I do hope that 
this study serves to motivate others to conduct empirical research on stewardship 
regardless of the existing stewardship constructs.  The opportunity exists for replicating 
past studies to ascertain stewardship theory’s relationship to common topics in strategic 
management and corporate governance.    
Moreover, the use of the stewardship constructs developed in this study tests the 
previously assumed positivist view that FOBs led by steward CEOs generate higher firm 
performance.  The mixed results provided in this study suggest family business scholars 
and corporate governance scholars should reexamine their assumptions regarding family 
firms (e.g.  Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007, Sirmon et al. 2008).   
Likewise, the empirical model and results presented herein reveal that executive 
stewardship combined with director resource provision influence the external social 
environment thereby having a positive impact on firm performance.  These results 
support a basic premise that owners can enhance firm performance by providing 
management resources and guidance via the firm’s board of directors.  This is consistent 
with the model presented by Davis et al. (1997) asserting that owners must provide the 
supportive environment necessary for the CEO to act in the best interest of firm 
stakeholders.     
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SUMMARY 
In conclusion, favorable empirical results presented in this paper sustain the 
movement toward alternate corporate governance theories to describe executive 
behavior.  Overall, this study provided support for some of the hypothesized 
relationships with a level of consistency regarding construct influence on firm 
performance.  The results suggest there is a non-economic influence on firm 
performance based upon CEO attributes associated with stewardship, firm attributes 
associated with family firm ownership, and board of director attributes associated with 
resource provision.  Examining the influence of CEO stewardship on firm performance 
via a variety of organizational contexts not only complements past agency theory 
research but will allow researchers to focus upon actors, actions, and activities that 
promote performance maximization instead of loss mitigation.  I submit that while both 
views attempt to maximize shareholder returns and firm value, the direction and 
trajectory used by stewardship theorists in the future will provide new insights for 
corporate governance scholars. 
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TABLE 1 
A Review of Individual and Organizational Attributes of Stewardship 
Author Publication CEO Attributes Organizational 
Attributes 
Findings 
Anderson 
and Reeb 
(2003) 
JoF   Reputable Family firms lead by family 
CEOs perform better than 
family firms lead by outside 
CEOs.  2.      Agency II issues 
are not present in the sample 
tested. 
Arthurs and 
Busenitz 
(2003) 
ET&P Organization 
centered 
Organizationally 
embedded 
  Stewardship theory fails to 
address the gaps left by agency 
theory in describing the VC-E 
relationship post funding. 
Bennedsen 
(2007) 
QJE High tacit 
knowledge High 
firm specific 
knowledge 
Interorganizationa
l trust 
CEO successions by family 
members lead to decreased firm 
performance and valuation. 
Benz and 
Frey (2007) 
AMR Pro-organizational 
Long-term view 
  Private sector corporate 
governance should adopt 
governance mechanisms from 
the public sector that facilitate a 
long term view of the business 
(term limits) 
Chrisman et 
al. (2003) 
JBV Selflessness 
Self-control 
Altruism 
Pro-organizational 
  Family business research in the 
field of entrepreneurship is 
incomplete wrt developing 
theory that has explanatory 
power. 
Corbetta and 
Salvatto 
(2004) 
ET&P Pro-organizational 
Collectivist  
Altruism 
Trusting 
Innovative 
Proactive 
Self-actualizing 
High trust 
Involvement 
oriented 
Empowering 
structures  
Stewardship theory adds to 
family business literature. 
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TABLE 1(Cont’d) 
Eddleston 
(2008) 
ET&P Idealized influence 
Inspirational 
motivation 
Intellectual 
stimulation 
Individualized 
consideration 
Strong 
organizational 
identity 
Self motivated 
Employee focused 
 Argues transformational 
leadership of the founder CEO 
enhances stewardship effects in 
the firm 
Eddleston 
and 
Kellermanns 
(2007) 
JBV Trusting 
Affable 
Self-actualizing 
Collectivist  
Pro-organizational 
Responsibility  
Committed 
Self-restrained 
Powerful 
Motivated 
Mutual trusting 
Involvement 
oriented 
Participative 
strategic process 
Intra-familial 
Clan-based 
collegiality 
Burden sharing 
Internal 
cooperation 
Participative 
decision making 
Collectivist 
culture 
Empowering 
culture 
Less political 
Altruism led to less relational 
conflict and higher participative 
strategy processes in family 
firms. 
Participative strategy processes 
and low relational conflict led to 
desirable organizational 
performance. 
Gomez-
Mejia et al. 
(2007) 
JOB Organizational 
citizenship 
behaviors 
 Stewardship is not precluded in 
agency theory when the 
ownership and manager 
interests are aligned. 
Agency costs may occur based 
upon outcomes in stewardship 
relationships if there is 
incomplete communication or 
the belief in the manager’s role 
is incongruent with the owner.  
Gomez-
Mejia et al. 
(2007)  
ASQ Organizational 
identity 
Powerful 
Self-referential wrt 
organization 
Altruistic 
High status Family firm CEO/TMT is risk 
seeking to protect 
socioeconomic wealth. 
Social, as well as economic 
factors, are involved in 
management decisions 
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TABLE 1(Cont’d) 
Jones (1995) AMR Note: TMT and 
organization are 
assumed to be one 
and the same based 
upon contracting 
assumptions with 
stakeholders  
 
Honest 
Possesses Integrity 
Trustworthy 
Reputable 
Reputable (to 
stakeholders) 
Corporate 
morality 
Trustworthy 
Cooperative 
Advance argument that 
stakeholder view of governance 
is more appropriate than agency 
prescriptions. 
Behaving ethically instead of 
with opportunism has long term 
economic benefit. 
Jones and 
Wicks 
(1999) 
AMR Concern for others 
Moral 
Fair 
Just 
Instrumental 
(socially) 
There is intrinsic worth in the 
claims of legitimate 
stakeholders. 
Morality and capitalism are 
compatible as efficient markets 
require a high level of moral 
parties. 
Firms whose managers establish 
and maintain mutual trusting 
and cooperative relationships 
with their stakeholders will 
achieve competitive advantage 
over those whose managers do 
not. 
Jones et al. 
(2007) 
AMR Loyal  
Reliable 
Diligent 
Dependable 
 
“corporate egoist” 
“instrumentally 
moral” 
“moral and 
altruistic” 
Corporate cultures emanate 
from separate stakeholder views 
that vary from agency to 
shareholder to stakeholder. 
Miller and 
LeBreton-
Miller 
(2006)  
ET&P Long-term focused 
Tenured 
Mission focused 
Powerful 
Few unrelated 
acquisitions 
Less risky 
investments 
More R&D 
Fewer downsizing 
events 
More 
nonfinancial 
projects (CSR)  
More patents 
Higher customer 
loyalty 
Better HR 
practices 
Flat org structure 
Few long term 
suppliers 
Long term orientations of firms 
allow management to invest in 
actions that create a competitive 
advantage (such as trusting 
supplier relationships) by allow 
the firm to focus upon the 
development of its core 
competencies. 
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TABLE 1(Cont’d) 
Lee and 
O’Neill 
(2003) 
AMJ Pro-organizational 
Collectivist  
Self-actualizing  
Self-managing 
Organizationally 
committed 
Value committed 
Organizational 
identification 
CEO has job 
security 
Agency adequately describes 
U.S. firms while stewardship 
adequately describes Japanese 
firms wrt R&D investing. 
Increased ownership stakes 
were associated with R&D 
investment. 
Stewardship and agency is 
situational. 
Miller et al. 
(2008) 
JMS Long term focused 
Organizational 
identification 
Personal 
satisfaction 
Socially embedded 
Social fulfillment 
Self actualization 
Community culture 
Motivated staff 
Well-trained staff 
Loyal staff 
Strong ties w/ 
outside stakeholders 
Emphasis on R&D 
Emphasis on 
reputation 
development 
Broadening the mkt 
and mkt share 
Transparent to build 
reputation 
Empowered 
employees 
Flexible, inclusive 
culture 
Gender neutral 
environment 
High client 
satisfaction and 
loyalty 
Marketing focused 
FOBs do more reputation 
development via advertising in 
different media outlets 
FOBs develop good work 
environment through training 
and work policies 
FOBs develop and manage 
customer connections 
FOB stagnation hypotheses are 
not supported. 
Sharma 
(2005) 
ET&P  Collectivist 
Communal 
Community culture and family 
structure is theorized to 
influence divestment decisions 
by family firms. 
Tosi et al. 
(2003) 
JMS Responsible 
Intrinsically 
motivated 
Collectivist 
Pro-organizational 
Trustworthy 
Accountable 
Manager 
discretion 
 Lab experiments show that 
agency prescriptions led to 
profitable decisions while 
stewardship decisions led to less 
profitable decisions. 
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TABLE 1(Cont’d) 
Wasserman 
(2006) 
AMJ Organizationally 
centered 
 Intrinsic 
motivation 
Attachment 
Commitment 
Personal 
satisfaction 
Self-
determination  
Powerful 
Tenured 
Lack of organizational 
controls 
Trust between CEO and 
BoD 
Founders receive less 
compensation than non-
founders. 
Founder discount decrease 
with the size of the firm. 
Evidence of non-financial 
benefits of founders 
Zahra et al. 
(2008) 
ET&P Intrinsic 
satisfaction 
Personal utility  
Unselfish concern 
Devotion to others 
Identification with 
the firm 
Organizational 
commitment 
Long-term 
orientation 
 
Employee empowerment 
Mutual trust  
Intra-familial altruism 
Clan based collegiality 
Shared commitment 
Mutual interdependence 
Pro-social culture 
Pro-organizational 
behavior 
Motivated employees 
Autonomous, 
independent workers 
Employee social identity 
with firm 
Worker discretionary 
contributions  
Employee commitment  
Cooperative culture 
Organizational trust 
Collectivist culture 
High stewardship cultures 
lead to higher strategic 
flexibility than low 
stewardship cultures. 
 
Journal Abbreviations 
AER:   American Economic Review  AMJ:  Academy of Management Journal 
AMR:  Academy of Management Review  ASQ:   Administrative Science Quarterly  
ET&P:    Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice JBR: Journal of Business Research 
JBV: Journal of Business Venturing  JCF:  Journal of Corporate Finance 
JFE:  Journal of Law and Economics  JMS:  Journal of Management Studies 
JOB: Journal of Organizational Behavior  JOF: Journal of Finance   
QJE:  Quarterly Journal of Economics 
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TABLE 2 
Evidence of Stewardship among Family Firms 
Author (Year) Journal Primary Subject Findings 
Anderson, 
Mansi, and 
Reeb (2003) 
JFE Ownership and 
Leverage 
1. Founding family ownership is associated with a 
lower cost of debt financing. 
2. Family firms provide incentive structures  that 
minimize agency costs and protect the interests 
of debt claimants 
Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) 
JLE Ownership, 
Diversification 
and Leverage 
1. Family firms diversify less and use debt on par 
with non-family firms. 
2. There lacks evidence for the Agency II assertion 
and minority shareholders benefit from 
ownership stakes in family firms. 
Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) 
JOF Family firm 
performance 
(agency theory) 
1. Family firms are 1/3 of the S&P 500 and 
perform better than non-family firms in the 
sample. 
2. Firms with family CEOs perform better that 
outside CEOs 
3. Study does not show presence of Agency II 
issues 
Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) 
ASQ Board 
Composition 
(agency theory) 
1. The most valuable public family firms are ones 
that have independent directors balancing firm 
representation. 
2. Agency II conflicts are mitigated when 
independent directors balance the power of 
family directors and management. 
Beehr, Drexler, 
and Faulkner 
(1997) 
JOB Role of Family 
Executive (Role 
theory) 
1. Interpersonal issues in small family businesses 
are not more detrimental to firm performance 
than non-family business. 
2. A family executive has more pressure to meet 
family expectations with respect to firm 
performance. 
Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, et al. 
(2007) 
QJE Ownership and 
CEO succession 
(Agency Theory) 
1. Family firm performance is negatively related to 
interfamily CEO successions 
Chrisman, 
Chua, and Steier 
(2003) 
JBV Special Issue 
Introduction 
1. One goal of the family entrepreneur is to build a 
business that is also a family institution. 
Chrisman, 
Chua, et al. 
(2007) 
JBR Agency vs. 
Stewardship 
1. Study found support for the use of agency based 
compensation mechanisms to align the interests 
of family managers. 
2. Altruism doesn’t blind families from reality that 
kinship doesn’t unconditionally guarantee 
appropriate behavior by relatives 
3. Better firm performance was linked to the use of 
incentives and control mechanisms. 
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TABLE 2 (Cont’d) 
Corbetta and 
Salvatto (2004) 
ET&P Agency vs. 
Stewardship 
1. Stewardship theory adds to family 
business literature where agency theory 
cannot adequately explain inter/intrafirm 
behavior. 
Gomez-Mejia, 
Haynes, et al. 
(2007) 
ASQ Business Risk 
(Behavioral theory, 
agency theory) 
1. Family firms may have greater 
organizational commitment and a long 
term orientation. 
2. Socioeconomic wealth held within a firm 
may cause the family leadership to 
behave in a risk adverse and risk seeking 
manner. 
Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel and 
Gutierrez (2001) 
AMJ CEO turnover 
(agency theory) 
1. Family related contracting decouples 
CEO employment from performance and 
risk 
2. The termination of CEOs with family 
relationships is positively related to firm 
survival and is met positively by equity 
markets. 
3. Relational contracting is theorized to 
avert issues with moral hazard and the 
divergence of principal-agent interests. 
Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, 
and Makri (2003) 
AMJ CEO compensation 
(agency theory) 
1. Family member CEOs receive lower 
total income than outsider CEOs, 
especially as family ownership 
concentration increases. 
2. Family CEO compensation is less tied to 
total business risk but more sensitive to 
systematic risk because they are tied to 
the firm via family ties. 
3. Family executives play the work role as 
steward of the firm and a non-work roles 
as protector of the family investment and 
obligations 
Jaskiewicz and 
Klein (2007) 
JBR Board Composition 
(Agency theory) 
1. When the values of the family small 
business owner (proxy for goal 
alignment) align with that of its 
managers, the board has fewer members, 
fewer outsiders, fewer family members 
and more affiliated members. 
Miller and 
LeBreton-Miller 
(2006) 
ET&P Ownership 
(Agency Theory) 
1. Long term orientations of family firms 
allow management to invest in actions 
that create a competitive advantage (such 
as trusting supplier relationships) by 
allow the firm to focus upon the 
development of its core competence 
Miller, LeBreton-
Miller, et al. 
(2007) 
JCF Ownership 
(Agency Theory) 
1. Family firm research is sensitive to the 
definition of “family firm”. 
2. Only family forms managed by the lone 
founder (concentrated ownership) 
outperform the broader population. 
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TABLE 2 (Cont’d) 
Perez-Gonzalez 
(2006) 
AER Ownership and 
CEO succession 
(Agency Theory) 
1. Inherited CEO’s have firms that perform 
more poorly (operating profit, market to 
book ratio) relative to firms that promote 
unrelated CEOs. 
2. Performance is more pronounced when 
inherited CEO does not graduate from 
“selective” undergraduate institutions. 
3. Nepotism hurts firm performance by 
limiting the scope of labor market 
competition. 
Sharma (2005) ET&P Divestment (M&A) 
(Resource based view) 
1. Divestment decisions are influenced by 
the breadth of family involvement and 
the collectivist nature of the family and 
community. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Control Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Tobin’s Q 1.25 0.93 0.05 6.82 
Relative Firm Performance 1.1 2.13 -3.61 30.30 
Firm Revenues ($B) 9.54 30.07 33.34
M 
345.98 
Firm Age 51.90 39.39 1 231 
Number of Directors 9.87 2.57 5 23 
Number of Board Meetings 7.11 2.61 3 19 
Independent Director Pct.  0.69 0.15 0 1 
Staggered Board (Y/N) 0.65 0.48 0 1 
CEO Age 56.18 6.69 40 81 
C EO Founder (Y/N) 0.09 0.27 0 1 
CEO Duality 0.59 0.49 0 1 
CEO Compensation ($M) 5.54 7.55 0.23 88.35 
Unexercised Exercisable Options 
($M) 
12.99 29.975 0 306.01 
Unexercised Unexercisable Options 
($M) 
3.06 6.87 0.00 101.46 
CEO Variable Compensation Pct.  7.05 48.86 0 1110 
Institutional Ownership Pct. 0.73 0.16 0.28 0.99 
Insider Ownership Pct. 0.11 0.14 0 0.86 
Governance Index 9.56 2.69 3 17 
Independent Variables     
CEO Board Memberships 1.89 1.30 1 9 
CEO Organizational Identity 50.55 2.18 43.00 57.91 
CEO Board Tenure 10.93 9.53 -2 54 
Family Ownership Pct. 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.51 
Family CEO (Y/N) 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Director Experience 123.99 55.25 15 355 
Affiliated Director 1.29 1.34 0 9 
Community Influential Director 2.58 2.22 0 12 
Support Director 3.63 2.12 0 11 
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TABLE 5 
Random Effects GLS Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors a: 
Results for Future Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) in Family Firm Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables 
Control  
Variables 
Steward 
CEO 
Hypotheses 
Family 
Firm  
Variables 
Family Firm 
Interaction 
Hypotheses 
Relative Firm Performance 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.023 
Firm Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Number of Directors -0.032* -0.032* -0.032* -0.034** 
Number of Board Meetings -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
Independent Director Pct. © -0.237 -0.243 -0.232 -0.229 
Staggered Board (Y/N) -0.274* -0.280* -0.276* -0.280* 
CEO Age -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
CEO Founder (Y/N) -0.029 -0.029 -0.003 0.003 
CEO Duality -0.087 -0.072 -0.075 -0.081 
CEO Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Exercisable Options  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Unexercisable Options 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Variable Compensation Pct.  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Institutional Ownership Pct. 0.746** 0.765** 0.739* 0.734* 
Insider Ownership Pct. © 0.465 0.490 0.497 0.480 
Governance Index © 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 
Independent Variables     
CEO Board Memberships  -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
CEO Organizational Identity   -0.000 0.001 0.000 
CEO Board Tenure  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003† 
Family Ownership Pct.   0.517 0.574 
Family CEO (Y/N)   -0.256* -0.274* 
CEO Board Memberships x  
Family Ownership Pct. 
   
 
 
0.343* 
CEO Organizational Identity x 
Family Ownership Pct. 
   
 
 
0.041 
CEO Board Tenure x 
Family Ownership Pct. 
   
 
 
0.019 
CEO Board Memberships x  
Family CEO (Y/N) 
   
 
 
-0.060 
CEO Organizational Identity x 
Family CEO (Y/N) 
   
 
 
-0.023 
CEO Board Tenure x 
Family CEO (Y/N) 
   
 
 
0.003 
Constant 1.845*** 1.700*** 1.680*** 1.685*** 
Wald χ² 87.55*** 88.95*** 92.28*** 97.72*** 
Δ Wald χ² (Δ d.f)   1.40 (3) 3.33 (2) 5.44 (6) 
R2 0.1469 0.1487 0.1648 0.1696 
Δ R2  0.0018 0.0161 0.0048 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p< .01  *** p< .001 
Year control variables have been excluded from table and are statistically significant to p < 0.05 
Two-tailed t-tests for control variables; one-tailed t-tests for the independent variables. 
All variables entered into interactions are centered. 
a n = 587 firm-years (268 firms) 
© : centered variable 
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TABLE 6 
Random Effects GLS Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors a: 
Results for Future Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) Director Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 5 Model 6 
Control Variables 
Control  
Variables 
Steward CEO 
Hypotheses 
Director   
Attribute 
Variables 
Director 
Interaction 
Hypotheses 
Relative Firm Performance 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Firm Revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Directors -0.032* -0.032* -0.019 -0.020 
Number of Board Meetings -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 
Independent Director Pct. © -0.237 -0.243 -0.492 -0.454 
Staggered Board (Y/N) -0.274* -0.280* -0.274* -0.237* 
CEO Age -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
CEO Founder (Y/N) -0.029 -0.029 0.002 -0.002 
CEO Duality -0.087 -0.072 -0.074 -0.088 
CEO Compensation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Exercisable Options  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Unexercisable Options 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Variable Compensation Pct.  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Institutional Ownership Pct. 0.746** 0.765** 0.740* 0.740* 
Insider Ownership Pct. © 0.465 0.490 0.528* 0.439 
Governance Index © 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.005 
Independent Variables     
CEO Board Memberships  -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 
CEO Organizational Identity  -0.000 0.001 -0.005 
CEO Board Tenure  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Director Experience   -0.001 0.001 
Affiliated Director   -0.025 -0.026 
Community Influential Director   0.009 -0.008
Support Director   -0.019 -0.026† 
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TABLE 6 (cont.) 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent Variables 
Director  Attribute 
Variables 
Director 
Interaction 
Hypotheses 
CEO Board Memberships -0.006 -0.012 
CEO Organizational Identity 0.001 -0.005 
CEO Board Tenure -0.003 -0.003 
Director Experience -0.001 0.001 
Affiliated Director -0.025 -0.026 
Community Influential Director 0.009 -0.008 
Support Director -0.019 -0.026† 
CEO Board Memberships  x 
Director Experience 
  
0.000 
CEO Board Memberships x  
Affiliated Director 
  
0.033** 
CEO Board Memberships x 
Community Influential Director 
  
0.010* 
CEO Board Memberships  x 
Support Director 
  
-0.010† 
CEO Organizational Identity  x 
Director Experience 
  
-0.000 
CEO Organizational Identity x  
Affiliated Director 
  
0.000 
CEO Organizational Identity x 
Community Influential Director 
  
0.008* 
CEO Organizational Identity  x 
Support Director 
  
0.004 
CEO Board Tenure  x 
Director Experience 
  
0.000 
CEO Board Tenure x  
Affiliated Director 
  
0.002† 
CEO Board Tenure x 
Community Influential Director 
  
-0.000 
CEO Board Tenure  x 
Support Director 
  
-0.000 
Constant 1.69*** 1.61*** 
Wald χ² 96.86*** 115.23*** 
Δ Wald χ² (d.f) 7.91 (6) 19.37 (12) 
R2 0.1483 0.1721   
Δ R2 -0004 0.0238† 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p< .01  *** p< .001 
Year control variables have been excluded from table and are statistically significant to p < 0.05 
Two-tailed t-tests for control variables; one-tailed t-tests for the independent variables. 
All interaction variables entered into interactions are centered  
 a n = 587 firm-years (268 firms) 
© : centered variable 
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TABLE 7 
Random Effects GLS Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors:a 
Results for Future Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) Family Firm / Director Model 
† p < .10  * p < .05  ** p< .01  *** p< .001 
 Model 7 Model 8 
Control Variables 
Family Firm/Director 
Attribute Model 
Family Firm/ Director 
Attribute Interactions 
Relative Firm Performance 0.023 0.024 
Firm Revenues -0.000 -0.000 
Firm Age 0.000 0.000 
Number of Directors -0.018 -0.020 
Number of Board Meetings -0.015 -0.017 
Independent Director Pct. © -0.531 -0.556 
Staggered Board (Y/N) -0.269* -0.240* 
CEO Age -0.008 -0.007 
CEO Founder (Y/N) 0.002 0.004 
CEO Duality -0.078 -0.097 
CEO Compensation 0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Exercisable Options  0.000 0.000 
Unexercised Unexercisable Options 0.000 0.000 
CEO Variable Compensation Pct.  -0.000 -0.000 
Institutional Ownership Pct. 0.716* 0.723* 
Insider Ownership Pct. © 0.521 0.422 
Governance Index © 0.009 0.005 
Independent Variables   
CEO Board Memberships -0.006 -0.013 
CEO Organizational Identity   0.002 -0.003 
CEO Board Tenure -0.003 -0.003 
Family Ownership Pct. 0.6141 -0.706 
Family CEO (Y/N) -0.277** -0.279* 
Director Experience -0.001 0.001 
Affiliated Director -0.031 -0.039 
Community Influential Director 0.010 0.010* 
Support Director -0.022 -0.028 
CEO Board Memberships x Family Ownership Pct. 0.402* 
CEO Organizational Identity  x Family Ownership Pct.  0.055 
CEO Board Tenure x Family Ownership Pct.  0.003 
CEO Board Memberships x Family CEO (Y/N)  -0.064† 
CEO Organizational Identity  x Family CEO (Y/N)  -0.011 
CEO Board Tenure x Family CEO (Y/N)  0.001 
CEO Board Memberships  x Director Experience  -0.000 
CEO Board Memberships x  Affiliated Director  0.027* 
CEO Board Memberships x Community Influential Director  0.014* 
CEO Board Memberships  x Support Director  -0.007 
CEO Organizational Identity   x Director Experience  -0.000 
CEO Organizational Identity  x Affiliated Director  -0.001 
CEO Organizational Identity  x Community Influential Director  0.008* 
CEO Organizational Identity   x Support Director  0.004 
CEO Board Tenure  x Director Experience  0.000 
CEO Board Tenure x Affiliated Director  0.002 
CEO Board Tenure x Community Influential Director  -0.001 
CEO Board Tenure  x Support Director  -0.000 
Constant 1.66*** 1.66*** 
Wald χ² 102.91*** 133.63*** 
Δ Wald χ² 13.96 (6) 31.89 (18) 
R2 0.1651 0.1897 
Δ R2 0.0164* 0.021* 
Year control variables have been excluded from table and are statistically significant to p < 0.05 
 Two-tailed t-tests for control variables; one-tailed t-tests for the independent variables. 
All interaction variables entered into interactions are centered  
a n = 587 firm-years (268 firms) 
© : centered variable 
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TABLE 8 
Summary of Hypotheses Tested (Model 8) 
 
Hypothesis  
Number 
Hypothesis Results 
1 CEO Socioemotional Wealth  
→ Firm Performance 
Not Supported 
2a Family Firm Ownership 
positively moderates H1 
Moderate Support: 
CEO Board Memberships 
2b Family Member CEO  
positively moderates H1 
Not Supported: 
Negative Effect 
3 Director Industry Experience 
positively moderates H1 
Not Supported 
4 Number of Affiliated Directors 
positively moderates H1 
Moderate Support: 
CEO Board Memberships 
5 Number of Support Specialist 
Directors positively moderates 
H1 
Not Supported 
6 Number of Community 
Influential Directors positively 
moderates H1 
Strong Support: 
CEO Board Memberships 
CEO Organizational 
Identity 
 
 
TABLE 9 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Hypothesized CEO Socioemotional Wealth Variables 
 
Variables Factor
#1 
Factor
#2 
Uniqueness 
CEO Board Memberships 0.171 0.166 0.944 
CEO Organizational Identity 0.190 0.017 0.964 
CEO Board Tenure 0.020 0.188 0.964 
 
Orthogonal Varimax Rotation 
Likelihood Ratio Test: χ² = 6.57, p = 0.087 
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FIGURES  
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FIGURE 1  
A Model of the Influence of CEO Stewardship, Family Ownership and Control,  
and Board of Director Characteristics on Firm Performance 
CEO Stewardship (H1)
(Socioemotional Wealth)
CEO Board Memberships
CEO Director Tenure
CEO  Commonality
Firm 
Performance
Tobin’s Q
Family Owned Business (H2)
Family Ownership Pct.
Family CEO
Board of Director Characteristics
Director Experience (H3)
Affiliated Directors   (H4)
Support Specialist     (H5)
Community Leader   (H6)
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FIGURE 2 
 
The Influence of Family Ownership Percentage on the Relationship between  
the Quantity of CEO Board Memberships and Firm Performance 
(1-Year Leading Tobin’s Q) 
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FIGURE 3 
The Influence of the Quantity of Affiliated Directors on the Relationship between  
the Quantity of CEO Board Memberships and Firm Performance 
 (1-Year Leading Tobin’s Q) 
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FIGURE 4 
The Influence of the Quantity of Community Influential Directors on the Relationship 
between the Quantity of CEO Board Memberships and  
Firm Performance (1-Year Leading Tobin’s Q) 
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FIGURE 5 
 
The Influence of the Quantity of Community Influential Directors on the  
Relationship between CEO Organizational Identity and Firm Performance  
(1-Year Leading Tobin’s Q) 
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